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Past and Present

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Agrarian Problem in Russia Before the Revolution

By V. MAKLAKOV

THE agrarian problem in Russia presented several paradoxes. A country of boundless territorial expanse, with a sparse population, suffered from a *shortage of land*. And the peasant class, elsewhere usually a bulwark of order, in Russia, evidenced in 1917 a revolutionary temper.

These peculiarities are rooted in history. I can deal here only briefly with their historic causes.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia had evolved a social order based upon serfdom. The landed class owned not only the land upon which the peasants were settled, but the peasants themselves. This crucial fact was reflected in the whole political system. The usual functions of the state—police, jurisdiction, collection of taxes, recruiting of the army—in rural Russia were performed by the landlords through the medium of their serfs, and the landlords were answerable for them to the state.

In 1861, with the emancipation of the serfs, the axis which supported the whole body politic disappeared. Other reforms became unavoidable; and the agrarian, judiciary, military reorganization filled the following years, known in history as the Era of the Great Reforms.

Serfdom became a thing of the past, but in its stead there arose the “peasant problem.” Remnants of the old feudal relationships survived into the new era. In 1861, the emancipated peasants had been endowed with land bought for them by the state from their former owners and had to pay off their debt to the state in instalments. In order to protect the peasants against the loss of their land, these “allotted lands,” as they were called, were declared by law “inalienable” and made the joint property of the whole village commune composed of former serfs of the same master. This commune was given the right of periodical re-allotment of the land among the individual homesteads. In this way the threat of “landlessness” was mitigated; but on the other hand, the peasant was made dependent on his commune in a manner unknown to the other

social classes and alien to Russian law. It must be admitted that as a transitional phase from "slavery" to "freedom" this was a bold concept. Rural self-government going so far as to include the distribution of common lands, judges and officials elected by the peasants themselves, the application to rural life of "customary law" instead of the general Code—all this represented a democratic solution of the chief problem posed by the historic situation: that of finding a substitute for the authority of the landlords over their serfs.

However, this provisional solution should not have hampered the process of the gradual extension of general civil legislation to the peasantry. After all, the transformation of the serfs into full-fledged citizens had been the chief purpose of the reforms. The reform of the judicial system and that of local self-government (*Zemstvo*) expressly recognized this goal. The same principle of "equalization" should have been applied to the problem of the "allotted lands" and the relationship between the individual peasant and the village commune. Autocracy, which in 1861 had used its absolute power to liberate the slaves and to endow them with land, surely would have been able to complete the process of "equalization." However, all great reforms have a tendency to change their pace—to slow up at times and even to give way to backward movements. "Revolution" and "reaction" are closely interlocked and feed each other. . . . So it happened in Russia in the late sixties. The reforms of Alexander II came to a standstill; and the seventies became a decade of intense revolutionary action directed against the person of the Sovereign. On March 1, 1881,—the very day when Alexander II signed the decree introducing a kind of "popular representation"—which might have developed into a genuine constitutional system—he was killed by a terrorist's bomb. The reign of Alexander III began.

It is understandable that the new Tsar, who succeeded to the throne under such tragic circumstances, felt no inclination to give up absolute power, and declared in his Manifesto of April 29 that he would "preserve autocracy for the good of the people."¹ The great mistake of Alexander III, to which he was driven by his new advisers, was not the preservation of absolute monarchy, which

¹The revolutionary party made public a letter to Alexander III upon his accession, promising to stop terrorism if autocracy were replaced by a constitution. Nothing could have been more compromising for all advocates of liberal reforms. As to the revolutionary party, it was soon crushed.

only a short while ago had fully justified itself, but that for its sake he repudiated the great reforms of his father and initiated reactionary legislation in the fields of education (1884), local self-government (1889), and the judiciary. The same thing happened to the peasant problem. A backward movement set in, and the peculiar features which had been considered temporary, now came to be regarded as the groundwork of the state.

It was this attitude that lent its unusual character to the peasant problem in Russia. Everywhere the peasantry forms a social class of small landowners. In Russia it became a kind of *caste*. Since it possessed the exclusive right to the lands allotted in 1861, and these lands had been made "inalienable" and inaccessible to the other classes, few outsiders could enter this "caste."

That was not all. Whenever a peasant was able to make his way up the social ladder, to obtain a university education, to achieve rank and position in government or military service, he was automatically raised into the higher social group of "honorary citizens" and ceased to be a "peasant,"—losing as a result his right to the allotted land. This system inevitably influenced the status of the peasant class. The élite of the peasantry, those who ought to have been the champions of its interests, withdrew from their class, and this kept alive the antiquated tendency to regard the peasants as an inferior social group. The state subjected them to all kinds of special impositions. Before the emancipation, these might have been justified by their status as serfs (so long as the system itself was not questioned). The peasants themselves, their time, and their labor belonged to the landlord. The civic duties actually performed by the serfs were imposed by the state upon the landlord who was responsible for their execution. The routine of local administration—the repair of roads and bridges, the fight against floods and fires, the maintenance of the lower police—all this was the obligation of the landowners within the boundaries of their estates, and it was carried out by their serfs. After the emancipation, these services became the responsibility of the peasants' elective authorities—who, in addition to looking after the needs of the peasants, were thus compelled to carry out the orders of the general administration. The heavy load of these impositions—which served the interests of the whole population—was borne exclusively by the peasants, who provided both the labor and the necessary funds.

This was not only a crying injustice but also a technically inefficient system. The obligation of the peasant class to "run er-

rands" for the general administration was an intolerable burden which distracted them from their real work, the cultivation of the land. The "elections" no longer were a matter of choosing the best men, but became a system of rotation. Some official attempts were made to correct the ensuing chaotic conditions in the villages. In 1889, the institution of "rural superintendents" (*Zemsky nachalnik*) was created—officers appointed by the government from among the local landowners. They not only replaced the former justices of peace elected by the organs of the local self-government (representing all classes), but were put in control of the peasants' elective authorities. Their decisions could be appealed only to their own District Assembly, presided over by the District Marshal of the Nobility. This innovation, which was meant to introduce some order into rural life, strongly reminded the peasants of their recent subjection to the landlords.²

Thus originated the "peasant problem" in Russia. Their legal status alone would have explained the peasants' discontent. But to this was added the economic burden. The land allotted to them in 1861 may have been sufficient to support them at that time, but the population increased, and the load of taxes and duties grew from year to year, while the land area at the peasants' disposal remained the same. The system of communal land tenure kept farming on the lowest level. To leave the village in order to seek supplementary work, one needed the permission of the commune, which was not given without compensation. The average peasant could obtain additional earnings only through renting some land from a big landowner, or hiring himself out to work on a big estate. The peasants were fully justified in resenting their condition; and it so happened that all the measures of the government directed their discontent against the landowners.

This had important consequences for the land problem proper. The peasants became convinced that they had a rightful claim to the land of their former masters. Under the system of serfdom, the master had the obligation either to provide his serfs with land or else to support them as his house servants. After 1861, if the emancipation had been completed, there would no longer have been any foundation for such a conception. But the government itself had turned the situation into a "class problem," with peasants and

²In addressing a delegation of village elders at his coronation, Alexander III said: "Obey the orders of your Marshals of the Nobility!" There could have been no clearer reminder of things that should have been better forgotten.

landowners in opposite camps. The subjection of the peasants to the landowners and their right to the latter's land were inextricably linked in the peasants' consciousness. The keener the peasant was made to feel his inequality with regard to the landowner, the stronger grew his conviction that he was entitled to the latter's land. (It is significant that the peasants, as was shown in 1917, usually claimed only the land of their own former masters). The idea that land was God's gift, and as such should not be the object of private ownership, had little to do with the peasants' conviction. That was a fond illusion of many Russian idealists. The Russian peasant, like any other peasant, was a believer in private property. He wanted the gentry's land for his very own.

One of the consequences of the peasants' attitude was the artificial aggravation of the land shortage. Russia had enough land for all who wished to cultivate it; but this presupposed an organized redistribution of the population and the settlement of vacant areas. It was not only the inertia of the government and the selfishness of the landowners—who profited from the availability of cheap labor near their estates—which prevented this redistribution: the peasants themselves resisted it, reluctant to abandon their right to the allotted lands and to give up the hope of coming into possession of the remaining lands of their former masters. In this way an artificial land shortage was created in the vicinity of the big estates.

The men at the helm of the state should have realized the danger that threatened Russia from this source; but under Alexander III they were in the grip of a violent reaction against the Great Reforms and blinded by their successful suppression of all revolutionary attempts. They believed in the necessity of upholding the old order. Their agrarian policy, accordingly, was based upon the preservation of some of the most outdated features of the traditional era: class division, isolation of the peasantry, its subjection to special laws and special authorities; in a word, the perpetuation of its inequality. The statesmen who shaped the agrarian policy of that reign were nurtured on these ideas. Witte alone of all the prominent men of that time understood that absolute monarchy could be saved only through a further development of the great reforms of the sixties. In charge of Russia's financial policy, he was determined to promote the industrialization of the country; and he realized that this presupposed a vast domestic market—a well-to-do farmer class instead of an underprivileged and pauperized peasantry. Witte's

ideas were taken up under the successor of Alexander III, when the whole problem was posed in a different way.

It is impossible here to go into details, but it is generally known that under Tsar Nicholas II the question of the fundamental transformation of Russia's political system—of the replacement of autocracy by a constitutional monarchy—definitely came to the fore. The public had reached the conclusion that no real improvement of conditions was possible under absolute monarchy and what was needed was a thorough "Reform" instead of partial "reforms." The movement which called itself "liberating" steadily grew. Its slogan was: "Down with Autocracy!" Any concrete amelioration of conditions was appraised by this movement only as another stepping-stone in the struggle for a new order.

This did not come about all at once. The régime still could have gone back to the Great Reforms—with the full support of public opinion. Witte actually attempted to approach the problem in such a way. In 1897, in his report on the national budget, he stressed for the first time the necessity of *equalizing the status of the peasantry* with that of the other classes. In the eyes of the conservatives this smacked of revolution. Witte sought the support of the wider public. A special conference on agricultural economy was convoked under his personal chairmanship and with the participation of prominent public leaders. This led to a conflict between Witte and the diehards of the old order; the conference was finally dissolved and Witte resigned. Only then did the "liberating movement" gain momentum. Now the illegal "Liberation League" (*Soyuz Osvobozhdeniya*), as well as the revolutionary parties, came to the fore. What solutions did they offer for the agrarian problem?

Let us begin with the Social-Democratic party. A minority of this party, known as "Bolsheviks," has won power in Russia at the price of giving up not only the name but the very ideals of social democracy. The S.-D. party had been an outgrowth of world capitalism, and in the fight against it favored *universal methods*. In Russia, industrial capitalism was still in the embryonic stage; the party, nevertheless, was determined to apply the tactics tested in Western Europe. Here, as elsewhere, it appealed to the factory workers and regarded the capitalists as the chief enemies. The Social-Democrats realized that the class struggle could take a normal course only under a system of "rule by the people"; their program, therefore, called for the establishment of a Republic, with all power residing in a parliament elected by universal suffrage. Even then, however, a

minority of the party, the future Bolsheviks, insisted that democracy should be preceded by a *dictatorship* that would achieve the total destruction of the existing order without interference—and thus clear the way for socialism.

The Social-Democrats' treatment of the peasant problem was ambiguous. Owing to the government's mistakes, the peasantry was in a revolutionary mood, and the S.-Ds were willing to take advantage of this. They were aware that the elemental destructive force of the peasantry was far beyond that of the urban working class, but they had little real sympathy with the peasantry, which was, after all, a class enemy of the proletariat. Hence the party's equivocations with regard to the problem.

At first the party was true to its ideology. In 1903, at its second convention, its platform included the abolition of all laws restricting the peasants' right to dispose of their land. As a result of this, the economically weakest members of the peasant class would have lost their plots. The S.-Ds would have welcomed this as a *step forward*—a strengthening of capitalism, but at the same time the growth of the social-democratic army. What the peasants themselves wanted, however, was *more land*; and to gratify them, the party was willing to give them the so-called "segments"—those strips of land indispensable to the peasants, which in 1861 had been left in the hands of the landlords, and had become a source of the peasantry's economic dependence. This was better than nothing, but it was so little that the S.-Ds themselves felt embarrassed. And so, when the other parties, including the Social-Revolutionaries (S.-R.) and the Constitutional-Democrats ("Cadets") made public their agrarian program, the S.-Ds, at their Stockholm convention in 1906, amended their own program, and began to advocate the confiscation of *all* lands belonging to the landlords. In conformity with their socialist ideology, they recommended that the confiscated lands be made the property not of individual peasants but of their organs of self-government—an idea that had not been advanced by the peasants themselves. History failed to give the S.-Ds a chance to show how they would have actually solved the problem and reconciled the "rule of the people" with the ideology of the "proletariat." Events outran them and left them behind. Only the Bolshevik section of the party has been able to put its ideas into practice. Under its dictatorship, the confiscated estates, instead of being turned over to the peasants, remained in the hands of the state and became the *Sovkhozy*—state farms. As to the "allotted

lands", which had belonged to the peasants since 1861, the Communists did everything to crush the individual peasants settled on them and to replace them with compulsory collective farms—the *Kolkhozy*. Collective farming represented a technical advance and might have proved an advantage, but the Soviet government insisted on doing everything with a high hand, using violence and coercion. The peasantry as a social class of small landowners was destroyed. The official slogan was "liquidation of the kulaks" (well-to-do peasants), but every individual owner of a plot was branded a "kulak" and treated accordingly. As a result of the Soviet agrarian reform, all the land came under state control and the peasants were compelled to work for the state—which was in fact a restoration of serfdom, but with a new ruthless master, the all-powerful state. As in 1861, the situation today cries for the emancipation of the peasants. Since technical progress has made the small individual farm unprofitable, it is difficult to foretell the future pattern of agriculture, but first of all, the peasant must be "liberated" once again.

The other socialist party—the Social-Revolutionary—based itself upon the peasantry. The interests of that class were the constant concern of the trend known under the generic name of "populism." It held no menace for the state; the improvement of the peasants' lot was possible within the framework of the then existing political and social system.

Unfortunately, the government followed a different course. And so it came about that in the beginning of the twentieth century, when the "liberating movement" got under way, the peasant class could be readily incited to revolutionary action. The peasants regarded the landowners as their chief enemies. Frictions that grew out of petty local causes could be easily turned by agitators into mass movements directed against the landowners. Such revolts, whenever they happened, would be ruthlessly put down by the government, with the result that the interference of the authorities undermined the people's faith in the Tsar as the protector of the common people against the "masters."

The Social-Revolutionary party was an outgrowth of this frame of mind. Its agrarian program had two sides.

On the one hand, the party demanded the requisition of *all privately owned land*. In this it went farther than the peasants themselves who claimed only the land of their own former masters. The

land problem was thus severed from the Russian past and considered on the plane of an *international* ideology.

On the other hand, the S.-Rs as a socialist party were opposed to the principle of private property, and the idea of turning over the confiscated estates to the peasants as their individual property, was repugnant to them. Their program, therefore, called for the transfer of the land to the "democratically organized rural communes for use on an equalitarian basis." The party was convinced that this was in harmony with the peasants' own conception of the land as the property of all. Only he who tills the land should be allowed to use it—but it should not belong to him as his property.

This idea has been often attributed to the Russian peasantry; and indeed, history had not taught the peasants to stand up for their individual rights, nor had it accustomed them to individual ownership of land. They had never enjoyed it, neither under the system of serfdom, or after their emancipation. Nevertheless, to assume that the Russian peasant did not aspire to become the rightful owner of his plot would be a rash conclusion. The opposite is probably true. The peasants submitted to the periodical reallocation of land by the communes as required by the law; but as time went on it became less frequent, the peasants managed to withdraw their homesteads from redistribution, despite all exhortations they failed to adopt "communal farming," and every single agricultural task was divided in such a way that everyone worked *on his plot for himself*. It cannot be determined whether the agrarian program of the S.-Rs was true to the peasants' own ideas or did violence to them. Today the question is academic: the party was not given the opportunity to convert its program into reality, although it won the majority in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was forcibly dispersed by the Communists after its first meeting. Later, the Communists boasted of having put into effect the whole agrarian program of the S.-Rs. The latter would have disclaimed this. What the Communists did was to restore the forced labor of peasants upon land that was not theirs—something very different from the dream of the S.-Rs.

Now let us consider the "liberal parties"—those who wanted to carry out their ideas within the framework of the constitutional system. Their influence varied in the course of time. The era of constitutional monarchy in Russia can be roughly divided into two periods: the first lasting from the introduction of the constitution

(February 23, 1906) to the "coup d'état" of June 3, 1907; and the second, from the latter date to the Revolution in February, 1917.

During the first period, the Constitutional-Democratic party ("Cadets") played the dominant part. It originated within the circle of seasoned Zemstvo workers and had participated in the "Liberation League"; it possessed an elaborate legislative program, as well as cadres of faithful supporters, long before the Revolution. It was victorious in the elections to the first Duma and assumed leadership in that assembly. What solution of the peasant problem did it offer at the height of its influence?

This problem had two aspects: the legal status of the peasantry on the one hand; and its provision with land on the other. Progressive public opinion had advocated "equal rights" for peasants for a long time. The Cadet party in the first Duma immediately introduced an "equal rights" bill. A special commission was charged to prepare four groups of laws based upon the principle that "all citizens of both sexes are equal before the law." It was assumed that this would incidentally solve the peasant problem. Such an assumption was obviously superficial. Next to the laws restricting the peasants' civil rights—which could be annulled without difficulty—there existed vast "special" legislation protecting their interests: the laws governing land tenure, the inalienability of the "allotted land," communal property, the right of the village commune to reallocate the land among the individual homesteads. The general Code ignored all these relationships. It would have been impossible to determine the respective rights of the commune and the individual member on the basis of the "equal rights" bill. The Cadet party gave no clear answer to these concrete questions.

The party's agrarian bill also failed to provide the answers. The party was very proud of it, complacently asserting that its adoption would have prevented the revolution. Its main feature was the "compulsory alienation of all private lands with compensation of the owners at a fair rate." "Compulsory alienation" doubtlessly conformed to the wishes of the peasantry. The Cadet party tried hard to lend it an appearance of legality. Confiscation with compensation is admitted by all legislations in *exceptional* cases. The party, admittedly, did not deny the right of ownership to the land; why then did it have to turn the "exception" into a general rule? The gradual transfer of the landowners' estates to the peasants was already under way; it could have been accelerated by fiscal pressure and other *legal* means. There was no need for such an extraordinary measure.

The bill calling for "compulsory alienation" undermined the very foundations of the principle of private property which, after all, at that time was still the basis of the whole social order. Moreover, so long as the technique of peasant farming remained unchanged, it was economically harmful, because it lowered the profitability of the land; in restoring the "class" approach, it ran counter to the principle of "equality"; and it was incompatible with the "protection of individual rights" to which liberalism was pledged. To rob the landlords of their property in order to give it to the peasants was a prefiguration in 1906 of the brutal and violent measures applied in 1928 by the Communist state to the "individual peasants."

Insofar as the demand for "compulsory alienation" was intended to win the support of the peasants, it was successful. But what were the party's plans regarding the tenure of the confiscated lands? It proposed to create a "state fund for allotment of land to the people who cultivate the soil by means of individual labor." The most urgent task—that of bringing order into the conditions of communal tenure and of protecting the rights of the individual member against the encroachments of the community—was ignored by the bill. Rural life was still to be governed by the principle described by the Duma member N. N. Lvov as "a rightless individual against a tyrannical crowd." The Cadet program, moreover, concentrated such an immense land fund in the hands of the state that the dependence of the peasantry upon the state and its organs would have been nothing less than a new slavery. This, too, anticipated on a small scale what was witnessed later, in 1917. Since the Duma insisted on that point, and its discussions kept the public in a state of excitement, the government finally dismissed the Duma (July, 1906) and attempted an agrarian reform itself.

Under Alexander III, the government's agrarian policy had taken a wrong turn. Now, after the dissolution of the Duma, the head of the government, P. A. Stolypin, put forth a "progressive program." Liberal parties still nurse a bitter memory of Stolypin's policies. This is understandable: in his merciless fight against the revolutionary surge he respected neither the constitution, nor the law, nor justice itself. Many were his sins,—and yet in his agrarian policy he was on the right track. It was *his* course, and not the agrarian bill of the Cadets, which might have stopped the revolution.

Without waiting for the second Duma to assemble, Stolypin put into effect two measures under Article 87 of the *Fundamental Laws* which enabled the government to carry out necessary measures in

the absence of the two Houses (Duma and State Council), provided a corresponding bill be introduced during the first two months of their next session. A rejection of such a bill would nullify the measures already taken. The attempt to transform the whole system of land tenure under such a proviso was indeed a bold undertaking; but the reforms in question were so important and so long overdue that Stolypin consciously disregarded the formal irregularity of his steps.

Stolypin's first decree (October 5, 1906) abolished the most notorious legal restrictions of the peasant class in the matter of freedom of movement, of education, etc. The necessity of this was so indisputable that the Duma—when the corresponding bill was brought in—didn't even take the trouble to consider it. Only ten years later, in 1916, was it taken up by the Duma then in session; not to reject it, but to broaden its scope. Article 87 in this respect offered certain advantages: the Upper House could not reject the amendments approved by the Duma without abrogating the whole measure. I reported the bill to the Duma, and I remember that after the adoption of various amendments the reporter of the same bill to the State Council conferred with me regarding a possible compromise. The February Revolution put an end to these conciliatory moves.

The second decree under Art. 87 (November 9, 1906) concerned the system of land tenure. It allowed the rural commune to divide the common land among the homesteads for good, to be owned privately; and it enabled those who so desired to withdraw their share from common ownership even without the approval of the commune. Such a delicate matter could not be settled without a special law. Only a law could define the share every homesteader could rightfully claim for his own, and how it should be apportioned. Stolypin's decree settled these questions, although not always fairly. Anyway, it liberated the peasant from the stranglehold of the commune.

The respective bill was introduced in the second Duma. The socialist parties could be hardly expected to support it—for didn't it actually promote bourgeois private property? The Constitutional-Democrats, although not socialists and avowed supporters of law and order, also opposed the bill, on the ground that it failed to mention "compulsory alienation of the land," which the party considered essential. Before any agreement with them could be reached, the Duma was dismissed once again. In violation of the constitution, the electoral law was changed in such a way as to ensure a

majority of representatives of the landed class in the next Duma ("coup d'état" of June 3, 1907).

When in November, 1907, the third Duma convened, the "Cadets" had lost their leadership to a party farther to the right—the Octobrists. The passage of Stolypin's bill was now a certainty, since the Octobrists were in full agreement with it. On the other hand, the opposition of the left was joined by the extreme right, which wanted to preserve the special status of the peasants and their dependence on the village commune. For the same reason the passage of the bill was threatened in the State Council, where it was finally adopted in a very close vote.

The opponents of the bill maintained that the peasantry would repudiate it, because private ownership of land was contrary to its sense of equity. Nevertheless, during the seven years that the law remained in force, 27 million *dessiatins*—nearly 80 million acres—were divided up among individual farmers, and 1613 thousand new homesteads were created. This result could not have been achieved through coercion alone: after all, the methods of government were not yet those of the Bolsheviks. The success of the reform was the best proof that the government had taken the right course.

Russia's evolution, however, was arrested first by World War I and then by the Revolution—which now threatens to become universal. What new order will be born out of it, how in the end the agrarian problem will be solved, how the interests of the "toilers" will be reconciled with the industrialization of agriculture and the necessity of large-scale farming—cannot yet be foreseen. This is not only a Russian, but a general problem. But in backward Russia, history has posed the problem under special conditions—as a survival of serfdom and feudal relationships. Within these limits it could have been settled without a revolution. If this was not done, and the social revolution broke out, of all places, in agricultural Russia, the responsibility for it rests on the one hand, upon the government which in its fight to retain power was afraid of reforms: and on the other hand, upon the inexperience of our political parties, who strove to solve world problems for which the time had not yet come in Russia. The history of the agrarian problem in Russia serves to illustrate this.

Soviet Law—*Terra Incognita*

BY GEORGE C. GUINS

THE study of Soviet Law has made considerable progress in the United States. However, the potentialities for this study are still very great.

The main subject of the different articles periodically published by leading legal magazines in this country is usually the presentation of some legal novelty characterizing the development of Soviet law. This is undoubtedly a necessary and very informative task.¹ A knowledge of Soviet legislation relating to the Soviet public structure in particular is indispensable for the understanding of the Soviet legal order and the organization of Soviet economic and social life.²

Pure information, no matter how vast in scope and precise in detail, is only part of academic work. It does not disclose the es-

¹John N. Hazard, "Soviet Property Law," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, v. 30, 1945, and his "Drafting New Soviet Codes of Law," *The American Slavic and East-European Review*, February, 1948; V. Gsovski, "Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law," *The Russian Review*, Autumn 1947; H. Berman, "Soviet Family Law in the Light of Russian History and Marxist Theory," *Yale Law Journal*, v. 56, 1946; Charles Prince, "The New Soviet Patent Law," *Journal of the Patent Office Society*, April, 1946—to mention only a few of those recently published.

²The so-called Stalin Constitution has been under more constant study than any other Soviet legal document. Nevertheless, Molotov's proposal for alternate presiding officers for the United Nations was unexpected, even though this system is applied in Soviet institutions, in accord with Article 45 of the Constitution. When Soviet representatives objected to Secretary of State George Marshall's proposal to establish a small U. N. Assembly for the period between regular sessions, the Soviet constitutional practice of replacing elected bodies with presidiums was not referred to, although it could have been very advantageous.

Comprehension of Soviet experience helps one to understand the method of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and in Asia, and the degree of socialization achieved at the present time by the satellites of the U.S.S.R. The postwar constitutions of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Albania are closely parallel, and their political régimes correspond to the Soviet standard. Recent indications point to an even greater rapprochement in the future. Collectivization, for example, seems imminent in all these lands, meeting resistance only in Yugoslavia. Temporarily postponed in certain of the satellite nations, collectivization was also postponed in the Soviet Baltic and Moldavian Republics. There is recent evidence, however, that collectivization has begun in the latter Republics. (N. D. Kazantsev, "Zakonodatelnye osnovy zemelnykh otnoshenii v SSSR," *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR*. Moscow. 1948, No. 5.)

sential peculiarities of Soviet law. Besides, if authors, as is usually the case, choose only the most "interesting" topics, lacking connection with the whole system of Soviet law, and without the necessary comments, then informative articles produce a wrong impression and can even at times look like propaganda of Soviet legalistic creativeness, although this is far from what the authors of such articles intend.

A comparative study of Soviet law is much more valuable. It displays the difference between the Soviet legal system and the law of other countries.³ Even the comparative method, however, is insufficient for understanding the Soviet legal system. Soviet law has no traditions, recognizes no innate rights, or established conventions. Everything is being adapted to current needs and, therefore, is easily and constantly changed, to conform with the Soviet policy of a given period. "Law is politics," in the words of Lenin. "Law is nothing unless connected with a definite policy," wrote Vyshinsky in a Soviet journal.⁴ He repeated this thesis at the Danube Conference in August, 1948, when he retorted to an allegation of the Western diplomats: "I do not accept the contention that policy ends where law begins. Law is an instrument of politics."⁵

Soviet law is connected with the policy of Socialist reconstruction; it is dictated by the general All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); it submits to the established order and it distributes rights as a reward for civil services. All these characteristics are to be expressed in a definition of the Soviet legal system.

Consequently, information about Soviet law, if not based on, or accompanied by, an explanation of the political motives of the Soviet government, remains sterile and uninstructive.⁶ Soviet law is

³The comparative method is successfully adopted by Vladimir Gsovski in his book *Soviet Civil Law*, v. I-II. Univ. of Michigan Press, 1949. His analysis and evaluation of all parts of the Soviet civil law advantageously differ from articles selecting particular subjects and depicting them as interesting novelties or as the achievements of the Soviet régime. In fact, as Dr. V. Gsovski illustrates with examples of the Labor law, many attractive provisions of Soviet law are either purely paper-work or are perverted in practice.

⁴A. Vyshinsky, "International Law and International Organization," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 1, 1948. "Although it is impossible to identify law with politics, it is also impossible to place law in opposition to politics," said Denisov, one of the outstanding Soviet jurists. (Quoted by H. Berman in "Soviet Family Law"—see note (1) above.)

⁵*Time*, August 30, 1948.

⁶We can refer for illustration to the article by John N. Hazard, "Political, Administrative, and Judicial Structure in the U.S.S.R.," recently published in *The*

transient and has no practical significance for foreigners. It deserves, therefore, a detailed study only insofar as it can serve as an indication of the basis of policy and of current trends in the Soviet Union. Some recent Soviet laws, a number of leading articles by American specialists, and the official Soviet reactions to different proposals in the field of international relations, are perfect illustrations of the above statements.

I

The fact that during the short period from 1945 to 1946, more than twenty-five *Ukases* were issued⁷ reorganizing the central apparatus of the U.S.S.R., cannot be interpreted without attention to the new rôle of the Soviet Union in the postwar world. The central government had been enormously enlarged and transformed into an extremely powerful bureaucratic machine comprising fifty-eight ministries.⁸ The renaming of the former commissariats as ministries, and the adoption of splendid new uniforms for the Soviet diplomats, generals, and admirals, had certainly been counted on to make an impression on the outside world, however accustomed it might be to such glamor.

Most significant, however, was the establishment of some double ministries: two ministries of Oil Industry, two of Coal Industry, two

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1949. (Cited hereafter as *The Annals*.) Professor Hazard's article in this symposium, informative and interesting as usual, does not reflect, however, any of the political and social phenomena described in the other articles in the same issue of *The Annals*. These articles describe the increasingly important rôle of the Communist Party after the War; the aggressive Communist foreign policy (p. 152, 206, 208); people's justice as a form of class justice (p. 167); the rigidity of Soviet dogma; and the decreasing fervor on the part of the new generation (p. 206). Professor Hazard's article, however, gives the impression that all these characteristic traits and peculiarities of postwar Soviet conditions and policy are not reflected at all in the current Soviet legislation. It may suggest to readers that the postwar legislation of the Soviet Union consists of purely administrative provisions characterizing a normal development of peace-time order: elections are taking place; the judicial system is improving; the right of discussion is growing. As the present author intends to prove, such an impression does not correspond to the real trends of Soviet legislation of the postwar period. Professor Hazard has missed some important laws of the postwar period, and has not analyzed Soviet legislation from the political point of view.

⁷See *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*. 1945-1946. Moskva, 1947.

⁸Art. 77 and 78 of the Constitution as amended by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in February, 1947.

of Fishing Industry; one for the Eastern and the other for the Western regions. It is hardly possible to explain this measure and the organization of a number of other ministries, as purely administrative acts. It is more comprehensible in connection with the Soviet tendency to control the economy of all satellites and the anticipated further expansion of the sphere of Soviet influence. Since this chance has been lost, an opposite tendency has begun to manifest itself, and ten of the newly organized ministries have already been abolished.⁹

The number of members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was reduced in 1947 from forty-two to thirty-three.¹⁰ This measure can be explained in several ways. As is well known, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is a puppet whose function it is to issue different decrees according to the directives of the Politbureau. It is not even known whether there are official meetings of this body. Reports or proceedings of any discussions in the Presidium never appear in the Soviet newspapers, although this body replaces in fact the Supreme Soviet, which has only two short sessions in a year. Members of the Presidium are evidently not overloaded with work,¹¹ and the above mentioned reduction of the number of members of the Presidium can be explained by the movement toward economy of human force after the last war.

The same measure, however, could also be explained as a political act of consolidating power and eliminating the possibility of ideological dissension. Such an explanation seems to be probable since the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is empowered to make all decisions affecting the State, including declaration of war, either for defending the state from attack or for fulfilling international treaty obligations. The postwar Soviet policy does not exclude the possibility of an armed conflict, and it seems to be expedient to decide such an important problem in a collegium consisting of a minimal number of members. However, decisions of such importance are voted by the Politbureau of the Communist Party, and members of the Presidium are exclusively Communists,

⁹A series of ukases abolished the duplication of the Oil, Fishing, and Coal ministries, and merged some others. According to the new amendment to the Constitution (Law of March 14, 1949), the number of ministries had been reduced to forty-eight. Later, a new one, the Ministry of Municipal Building, was established by the *Ukaz* of June 1, 1949 (*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta*, June 10, 1949).

¹⁰Law of February 25, 1947.

¹¹During the eight months of 1949, the Presidium approved five insignificant ukases. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta* was filled with citations of different awards to the heroes of Socialist labor.

one hundred percent loyal to the leaders of the Party. Therefore, we cannot support the explanation of the cited law by political motives. The explanation offered above seems to correspond better to the postwar lack of personnel suitable not only for a purely decorative institution, but for responsible public work.¹²

Consolidation of power is accomplished in the postwar Soviet Union by the strengthening of the influence and authority of the Communist Party. Just as it was before the war, all important orders and decisions are now issued in the name of both the government and the Party. The government of the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party have completely integrated their powers.

The commanding staffs of the troops of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (M.V.D.) and of the Ministry of State Security (M.G.B.) have been awarded the ranks, titles, and insignia of generals, admirals, and officers of the Red Army and Navy.¹³ Both these ministries recruit their troops from Communists only. Having the same rank and uniforms as the Army and Navy, the officials of the secret police share with them their war glory and their merits; they impress foreigners outside the country with their uniforms and medals and, what is most important, overshadow the Army and Navy officers, thus increasing the Party's prestige at the expense of the military forces.

Soviet international and intra-national policies have shown distinct divergence since World War II from Stalin's prewar policy. The pattern is clearly outlined, not only in the laws, augmented by editorials in *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, but also in official declarations and speeches, in government reports to the Plenum of the Communist Party and to the Supreme Soviet. All these indicate a closer co-ordination of Soviet activities directed toward a renewed ideological onslaught against the capitalist world and the resurgence of a Com-

¹²The explanation given in the text finds confirmation in the fact that the reduction of the number of members of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet was adopted also by the R.S.F.S.R. Instead of the twenty ordinary members of the Presidium, there are thirteen, according to the new amendment to Art. 31 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. (Law of March 14, 1948.) The Presidiums of the Constituent Republics do not decide such important problems as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and the reduction of the number of members can be explained only as a measure of staff reduction. The same tendency is displayed in the acts abolishing different local Soviets, and the liquidation of a number of recently organized ministries of the R.S.F.S.R. (several ukases approved by the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. on May 27, 1949).

¹³Ukaz of July 6, 1945 (*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1945. No. 39).

unist offensive. It is a serious oversight not to emphasize this trend so clearly displayed in current Soviet legislation. Is it not amazing that soon after the end of the war the Soviet legislative body issued a ukase establishing a strict responsibility of all citizens for leakage of intelligence and even for the loss of secret documents?¹⁴ And what about the fact that the Soviet Union earlier than any other nation has united all her fighting men under the guidance of a single Ministry of Armed Forces?

In spite of the termination of the War, military uniforms which had been allotted during hostilities to many civilian workers have continued to be worn, and their use has even been extended by some of the new decrees. This is not without significance as an illustration of the continuing militarization of the administrative apparatus.¹⁵

Thus, an examination of Soviet law not only reveals the intentions of the Soviet government which we have characterized above as a Communist offensive, but it even helps to publicize these intentions and trends.

II

In the field of economy, current Soviet legislation indicates unmistakably the design of Soviet planning and the vulnerability of Soviet economy.

The legal system of a free economy is characterized primarily by principles of initiative and competition based on property rights and freedom of contracts. In studying the law of the capitalist countries one cannot divine what new enterprises will be organized, which ones will survive, or what will be the level of wages and conditions of labor in general. Such is not the case as far as a country with a planned economy is concerned. There everything is regulated and subjected to the central management. Economic legislation dominates the whole sphere of economic activities: production, trade, distribution of wealth. Both the government's plans and all the obstacles which have to be overcome for the realization of these

¹⁴Ukaz of June 9, 1947, and the decree of the Council of Ministers defining a "state secret"; among which are plans for import and export of various kinds of merchandise; geological resources and the extraction of nonferrous and rare metals and soils; discoveries, inventions, technical improvements, and research and experimental works in all fields of science (see *Izvestia*, June 10, 1947).

¹⁵As an example: *Ukaz* of June 28, 1949, on the militarization of the Guard of the Ministry of Ways and Communications; the earlier example of the militarization of the River Fleet.

plans become clear from the content of current legislation. Stammller's formula for the correlation between Law and Economy¹⁶ is here especially obvious.

The Soviet government has issued since the end of the war a series of regulations concerning the kolkhozes. The law adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on March 18, 1946, to put the Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950 into action contains the following instructions: "Greater discipline shall be exercised by the collective farms in discharging their obligations to the State in respect to deliveries of farm produce."¹⁷

There followed, in September, 1946, a decree establishing a special Council of Collective Farms whose purpose it was to eliminate violations of the Collective Farm Charter. Soon afterwards, in February, 1947, the All-Union Communist Party issued resolutions containing significant decisions concerning the organization of the kolkhoz economy and the taxation of the kolkhozes. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. later published a ukase establishing rewards for bigger harvests.¹⁸ The cumulative impression is that the Soviets were encountering difficulties on the agricultural front; a fact evident from other sources as well. Of greater significance, however, was the evidence that the collective farms were being disrupted by disorders, and that principle and propaganda had to find a substitute for legislation in rewards designed to stimulate uncooperative and indifferent farmers to contribute their energies to the collectives.

It is further evident from the laws passed to punish plunderers of "socialist property" and to protect private property, that the theoretical responsibility to the community has been overshadowed by traditional individualism, particularly among the peasants.¹⁹

¹⁶Rudolph Stammller, *Recht und Wirtschaft*, 1896, taught that law is like a cast, and economy the material taking the cast's form.

¹⁷The last paragraph of Art. 30 of the law on the Five-Year Plan of March 18, 1946.

¹⁸Ukaz of April 24, 1948. In 1949, three new ukases were issued establishing rewards for achievements in the field of cattle-breeding (April 20); for high harvest of cotton (May 20); for high harvest of jute, etc. (June 22). See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, April 30, May 28, and July 3, 1949.

¹⁹Survivals of individualism among Russian farmers is evident from repeated stories in Soviet newspapers, particularly those concerning areas of the Ukraine. "Survivals of capitalism" are still lingering in the minds of a vicious minority, writes *Pravda*, Aug. 20, 1947, characterizing the psychology of those who want "to exact more for themselves from the state and to give less." Survival of this in-

In 1932, the first laws were passed which condemned to death anyone found guilty of pillaging socialist property, including kolkhoz property, as well as anyone who committed an act of violence against the kolkhoz farmers—with a minimum of ten years' imprisonment.²⁰ This drastic law of 1932 was interpreted extensively by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.,²¹ and was still enforced in 1947.²²

Law is a mirror reflecting the realities of life. A law also gives, however, an idea about the type of man whom the legislator wants to educate for the future: the "new Soviet man," as far as the Soviet law is concerned. Thus, through the mirror of Soviet laws one can come to know the citizen of the "socialist" state. One can see reflected in the above cited laws the peasant individualist who incessantly and stubbornly resists socialist methods of agricultural economy. If laws reflect the differences and the obstacles which a government finds it necessary to overcome, then the desperate struggle which the Soviet government is carrying on to quell the resistance of the peasants becomes increasingly manifest.

Soviet industry and trade have been similarly plagued by the individualistic psychology of the Soviet citizen in his growing conflict with the socialist law, which attempts to mold him into a cog within the machinery of the state. Since 1929, during the period of industrialization, the requirements of strict discipline and unconditional obedience have been characterized by ruthless prosecu-

individualistic psychology and the futility of the Soviet government's struggle against it, are sufficiently clear from the content of the laws progressively strengthening penalties against the opposition of the farmers. (See notes 20 to 22 below.)

²⁰Law of Aug. 7, 1932, "On the protection of property of state enterprises, kolkhozes and cooperative property, and on invigorating public (socialist) property." Capital punishment established by this law for the most important crimes was later correspondingly modified to a maximum of twenty-five years of forced labor, according to the *Ukaz* of May 26, 1947, which has abolished the death penalty in peacetime.

²¹Rulings of the Supreme Court of Feb. 25, 1933; June 9, 1934; Aug. 15, 1940. (See *Sbornik Deistviushchikh Postanovenii Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR. 1924-1944*, pp. 5-11.)

²²The *Ukaz* of June 4, 1947, regarding the Protection of State and Public Property, established as a penalty imprisonment of from ten to twenty-five years, with confiscation of property of the convicted criminals. The same crime against collective farm property entails in the first instance a five to eight year sentence with or without confiscation, and in the second instance, if committed by a band or on an especially large scale, confinement for a period of from eight to twenty years with confiscation of the property of the criminals. The law strictly punishes not only direct participation in the crime, but also failure to inform the authorities about a committed or intended plundering of State property.

tion of saboteurs, wreckers, thieves, and those who misappropriate state property. The Soviet law of this period is marked, however, not only by these compulsory measures. In order to carry out a program of industrialization it is expedient to stimulate and encourage the producers. On the basis of this knowledge, and following the "line" of the All-Union Communist Party, personal property has been acknowledged, and special rights have been distributed as a reward for services beyond the minimum.²³

The legal nature of individual rights in the Soviet Union is, however, unorthodox by the standards of other nations. Individual rights are supposed to be secured by the "socialist order" but not guaranteed by law. Citizens of a socialist state by basic definition of the socialist economy receive the right to a share in the common wealth, according to their abilities and labor. The socialist order also guarantees the right to rest, leisure, old age, sickness, and disability benefits, and the right to education. These rights are merely conditional advantages in the Soviet Union, dependent upon the practical results of "socialism."²⁴

Not less conditional is the right to property in Soviet law. This right is also based on specific peculiarities within the Soviet economic structure. Soviet experts assert that "there is personal property in the Soviet Union but no private property." "We do not recognize anything private," said Lenin, "in the field of economy, everything is public and nothing private from our point of view."²⁵

The characterization of property as "personal" as distinct from

²³The significance of penalties and rewards in the Soviet legal system is depicted by the present writer in a special survey which will be published at a future date.

²⁴The conditional character of individual rights is quite clear from the text of the Constitution: "The right to rest and leisure is insured . . . by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs . . ." (Art. 119); ". . . the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability . . . is insured by . . . the provision of a wide network of health resorts . . ." (Art. 120); etc.

A. Vyshinsky stressed the significance of individual rights in the legal system of the Soviet Union at the first conference of juridical-scholars convoked in Moscow in July, 1938. See his report published in the *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo* No. 4; 1938. An objective and independent scholar must not take for granted qualifications given by the Soviet jurists, nor accept legal terminology, which is deceptively uniform in both the capitalist and Soviet systems.

²⁵"It would be a mistake to characterize the right of personal ownership as the right of the owner to make use of his property at his own discretion. The owner may not dispose of, or make use of, personal ownership in a manner contrary to the interests of the socialist economy . . ." (Textbook of Civil Law, 1944. pp. 276-78); also *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava*, Moscow. 1947. p. 317.

"private" emphasizes the insignificance and the limited scope of the economic and social functions of private ownership in the Soviet state. The personal property rights of the individual have little significance when in conflict with the interests of the state. One of the postwar laws considerably increased punishment for robbery of private property.²⁶ This does not change the character of property rights; the new law protects first and foremost those privileged groups of high civil and military officials, heroes of socialist work, and Stalin laureates, whose prosperity excites the jealousy of average workers and peasants, and provokes crimes of revenge. This explains why the new law was issued simultaneously with another ukase protecting state and kolkhoz property. It could not have been just a simple coincidence.

An exhaustive characterization of the peculiarities of "personal ownership" in the Soviet Union has been made by the Soviet jurist, P. Orlovsky.²⁷ He writes that every owner must use his property economically and fittingly. Its use for a purpose contrary to law or *in fraudem* of the law, or infringing on the principles of socialist society, or causing injury to the socialist state or to other owners, is prohibited. An owner has no right, for example, to slaughter pedigree cattle, to sell or exploit his property for speculative purposes, or to make a profit from the sale, lease, or loan of it.²⁸ Property may be confiscated if the owner mismanages it; for instance, failing to make repairs on a house when needed. Bequests and donations exceeding one thousand rubles may not be made unless certified by an official Soviet notary public; making donations not thus legalized is punishable by the court.²⁹

Subject to public law, Soviet ownership of personal property is not an absolute right.³⁰ Restrictions to which an owner may be

²⁶The *Ukaz* of June 4, 1947. No. 19. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta*. 1947.

²⁷P. Orlovsky, "The Right of Personal Ownership by Citizens" (in Russian), *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo*, 1938. No. 6, pp. 68-84.

²⁸The purchase or resale by private persons for profit (i.e. for speculation) of any agricultural produce or of any article for mass consumption may result in ". . . deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than five years and confiscation of goods in whole or in part." (Art. 107, Penal Code.)

²⁹Art. 63, Penal Code.

³⁰For reasons given in the text we cannot agree with even such careful characterization of Soviet property rights as the following: "Administrative law predominates; the law of inheritance or of personal property is not very highly developed. Nevertheless, there is sufficient resemblance to give an American lawyer the feeling that he is in familiar territory." (H. Berman, "The Spirit of Soviet Law," *Washington*

subjected cannot be foreseen, and there is no way for him to protect his personal rights against the state. The currency reform of December 14, 1947, proved that even savings are not guaranteed against confiscation in legal guise.³¹

Thus the study of Soviet economic law reveals the essence of the "socialist" state and the relativity of all individual rights and personal property rights in the Soviet Union.

III

The special character of Soviet legal philosophy is not less apparent in problems of international law. If the Soviet state is not subject to any inviolable principles of law in its internal policy, it is even less so in the field of international law.

International law is still the most imperfect branch of juridical science due to the lack of sanctions, giving as yet the weakest protection to vulnerable parties. It is chiefly law regulating interrelations between independent, sovereign nations in conformity with their treaties and agreements, and makes a nation responsible for torts and violations to the other party only, and not before an international court. Nevertheless, the general direction of intercourse between nations is toward mutual protection of international ethics by legal means, and the recent development of international law promises further progress in this direction. It becomes, when necessary, a system of public law (*jus publicum*), with the submission of the private interests of particular states, including the great powers, to the interests of the community of nations. The United Nations was inaugurated in order to establish support of the principles of law and justice, rather than might and violence, as the bases of international relations.

Unfortunately, this noble and progressive trend does not meet with a sympathetic attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R., which takes for granted the irreconcilability of interests and the inevitability of conflict with the capitalist world.³²

ton Law Review, May, 1948, No. 2, pp. 64-65.) Emphasis on the similarities between Soviet law and other legal systems can be misleading. On the contrary, a proper description of the system of Soviet law demands a primary delineation of the essential dissimilarities—the similarities are apparent.

³¹The reform of 1947 was not a simple devaluation of currency, as exchange was not equal for all those in possession of money. (See B. Alexandrov, "The Soviet Currency Reform," *The Russian Review*, January, 1949.)

³²"We are encircled," said Lenin in a speech on November 26, 1920, at a meeting of Communist Party secretaries, "by imperialist states which hate us Bolsheviks

The Soviet attitude toward international law relegates it to the position of temporary coexistence between the socialist and the bourgeois nations, neutralizing and paralyzing inimical forces,³³ and strengthening the position of the socialist bloc. Duplicity and instability are correspondingly inherent in the Soviet attitude toward different principles of international law.³⁴

The Soviets cannot and will not accept unconditionally all norms of existing international law. It is impossible for them to submit to the regulations produced by agreements or judicial practice of the anti-Communist world. Consequently, they must definitely oppose the establishment of a permanent court of international justice with compulsory jurisdiction *ipso facto*, eliminating private agreements between the parties involved. They now insist, and will continue to insist, for the same reasons, on the right of *veto*, which protects them against submission to any decisions of the inimical majority. They oppose freedom of the air relative to Soviet territory because they are sure that this freedom is wanted mostly for espionage. Their withdrawal from participation in the International Civil Aviation Conference in 1944 did not come as a surprise to those familiar with Soviet foreign policy. For the same reasons, they will continue to

to the depths of their souls." The same idea was expressed by Stalin in his famous letter to a member of the Comsomol, Ivanov, and repeated again, after the War, in his pre-election speech of February 9, 1946 (see *The Annals*, pp. 125, 192). The most positive statement of this trend is found, however, in Zhdanov's speech, and in the Declaration of the Cominform in September, 1947 (see *Bolshevik*, October 15, 1947).

³³Lenin's Machiavellian recipe was formulated (Second Congress of the Comintern, 1920) very distinctly: "Since the imperialists were vastly more powerful militarily and economically, the Soviet Republic had to protect itself by other means" . . . "we must use the antagonism between the two existing systems of capitalism . . . between the two groups of capitalist states—in such a way as to set one against the other." (Quoted by Prof. Harold H. Fisher in *The Annals*, p. 192.)

³⁴For further details on this instability in the concept of international law in Soviet juridical literature see R. Schlesinger, *Soviet Legal Theories*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 272-290; J. Hazard, "Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist Theories," *The American Journal of International Law*, v. 32, pp. 242-252; Eugene Korovin—"The Second World War and International Law," *ibidem*, v. 40, 1946, pp. 742-55; L. B. Shapiro, "The Soviet Concept of International Law," *Year Book of World Affairs*, v. II, 1948, pp. 272-310. Mintauts Chakste, "Soviet Concept of the State, International Law and Sovereignty," *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1949.

The Soviet attitude toward certain institutions of international law cannot be correctly explained on the basis of "patriotic feelings and pride" as J. Hazard attempts to do in his article "Soviet Union and International Law" in *The Illinois Law Review*, v. 43, November-December, 1948.

oppose the formation of an international army, which, in their view, would always be a potential threat to the Soviet Union.³⁵

Soviet delegates to the United Nations have voiced the attitude of their government by opposing approval of the "Universal Charter of Human Rights" and, consequently, oppose the recognition of individual freedoms as institutions protected by the Charter of the United Nations. They refer to the necessity of improving a draft of the proposed Charter, including the protection of colonial peoples and national minorities, but the real basis for their opposition is elsewhere. Individual rights and freedoms are not protected in the Soviet Union as they are in the democratic countries because of the predominance in the Soviet Union of the socialist state's interests over individual rights. Furthermore, control by the United Nations of Soviet activity, as exemplified in the matter of atomic control, or any discussion of the Soviet régime and of possible complaints against violation of human rights by the Soviets, is unacceptable to the Soviet State.³⁶

Expediency is of greater significance for the Soviets than principles of law. Duplicity and inconsistency in their philosophy of international law are therefore inevitable. They object to the acceptability of the principle *clausula rebus sic stantibus*, and defend the inviolability of international treaties, but they themselves do not avoid violation of treaties when this is to their advantage.³⁷ They oppose economic imperialism and at the same time organize in Rumania and Hungary bi-national stock companies in raw materials and transportation, and thus subject these two countries to Soviet economic pressure in the manner of former economic imperialism.³⁸ The Soviet Union defends the principles of unanimity in the Security Council of the United Nations but at the same time will not allow Yugoslavia to oppose decisions of the Cominform. The Soviets

³⁵Many illustrations of this divergence in fundamental principles of international law are given by Charles Prince: "Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization of Security, Economic Co-operation and International Law: A Summary," *The American Journal of International Law*. 1945, pp. 450-485; also in *The Annals* ("Soviet Policy in the United Nations," by C. Dale Fuller, and others).

³⁶"A claim by Russia to be bound only by a portion of the law of her own selection," L. B. Shapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

³⁷Attack on Poland and on Finland; violation of non-aggression pact with Japan; postwar policy in Manchuria and in Iran.

³⁸*The Annals*, p. 160. In Germany the Soviet Union transferred a number of factories into its own property for the reparation account. The twenty-five holding companies control about 180 factories belonging at present to the Soviet Union.

oppose the imperialist division of the world into spheres of influence and then transform Manchuria, Northern Korea, and all their European satellites into typical spheres of influence. They ardently oppose any infringement of national sovereignty, and in practice abolish sovereignty not only of their own national republics but even of the satellites.³⁹

It is absolutely impossible to deduce the Soviet conception of international law from the words of the Soviet jurists, who ignore the international practice of the Soviets. We can only make the deduction that their conception of international law is not, and cannot be, stable, since it is adjusted to the changing situation and is entirely subjected to the requirements of current political trends.⁴⁰

The above observations lead us to the following conclusions: (a) in addition to the practical significance of familiarity with Soviet law, the study of the subject promotes the understanding of many distinctive features of the Soviet system and reveals the basis of Soviet policy; (b) Soviet law must be interpreted in reference to Soviet policy and to the particular characteristics of the Soviet social and economic system; (c) general comprehensive principles of Soviet law must be formulated independently of Soviet jurisprudence, as the legal theories formed by Soviet jurists are dictated by Soviet policy to no less degree than is Soviet legislation; (d) analysis of the Soviet legal system clearly shows how unstable and conditional are its legal principles, wherein expedience dominates.

³⁹I. D. Levin, in his widely circulated pamphlet *Printsip suvereniteta v sovetskem i mezhdunarodnom prave* (*The Principle of Sovereignty in Soviet and International Law*), Moscow, 1947, pp. 11, 15, emphasized the fact that in addition to formal political independence, true sovereignty presupposes economic independence from the imperialist states and sufficient defensive power. From the point of view of this theory, sovereignty of the Constituent Republics of the Soviet Union has to be denied.

Sergius Yakobson, in his article "The Soviet Concept of the Satellite State" (*Review of Politics*, April, 1949, v. II, No. 2, pp. 184-195), asserts that within the sphere of Soviet political influence, actual sovereignty has already been abolished. His conclusion corresponds to Levin's theory because the satellites have neither economic independence nor sufficient defensive power.

*The Soviet practice of extermination of all inimical groups in the occupied countries finds its theoretical justification in Professor Korovin's discussion of the Hague rules (*op. cit.*, p. 753). Every anti-Communist and anti-Soviet organization and group is "anti-democratic," and its extermination is a sacred duty of the Soviet Union as the protector of justice and liberty and as a real democracy. From this point of view any preventive military measures can also find justification and approval.

"Berdanka"*

BY ALEXANDER TARSAIDZE

"In regard to Russia, the case is a plain one. She has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she has always wished us well and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best."

—William T. Seward to Bayard Taylor, 1863

BERDANKA" was a household word throughout old Russia for over half a century. Yet strange as it may seem, few Russians and, naturally, still fewer Americans, have ever pondered on the origin of this name. "Berdanka"—a standard rifle introduced into the Imperial Russian Army in 1868—has played ever since a historic rôle in all Russian wars, conquests, and revolutions. Thus this rifle "saw service" in the conquest of Turkestan in 1870, in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-79, during the Russian penetration into Afghanistan in 1880-90, in the acquisition of Port-Arthur in 1898, in World War I, and, finally, in the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1918-21.

Today "Berdanka" is quite forgotten. Nevertheless, among many Russians throughout the world this name calls up memories of Russia's past and, in particular, of her past relations with America.

Even in the early days of the United States, Russia was a loyal friend of the young transatlantic republic and followed its development with affection, respect, and sincere interest. It was in particular the growth of American industry and its technical achievements which Russia watched with the closest attention.

It is recorded that as early as 1782, the Empress Catherine the Great dispatched engineers to faraway America in order to acquire the plans for the construction of an iron bridge in Salem, Massachusetts. The interest in American technical progress was intensified under Alexander I, when Robert Fulton, the famous inventor of the steamship, was granted a concession for building "pyroscaphs" in Russia. Fulton died before having had a chance to see his invention converted into reality in Russia—where, in 1815, the first steamer "Skory" ("Swift") was plying between St. Petersburg and Kronstadt, proudly puffing up smoke through its brick funnel.

*This article is part of a chapter from the author's forthcoming book: *Czars and Presidents—the Forgotten Friendship* [Ed.]

During the reign of Nicholas I, numerous missions were sent by the Tsar to the United States.

In 1830, a group of Russian naval officers arrived in this country with the mission of ordering here the first Russian steam-driven warship. They remained until 1831; and, incidentally, their American experiences stimulated the later introduction of railroads in Russia. They were invited by the president of the Baltimore-Ohio Railroad to make a trip on the "Aeolus"—the name of a wagonette provided with sails, which moved along on rails and may have been the forerunner of the first train. This adventure, related to Tsar Nicholas I, gave him the idea of inviting American engineers to build the Nikolaevsky railroad between St. Petersburg and Moscow, opened in 1851.

That same group of officers ordered here a first-rate frigate propelled by steam,—later christened the "Prince of Warsaw" and stationed in Kronstadt as a guard-ship.

In 1847, the steam-frigate "Kamchatka"—considered a "technical marvel"—was launched in New York. In 1858, the frigate "General-Admiral" proudly hoisted the flag of St. Andrew in the dockyards of Manhattan. Since then, numerous Russian warships have been built in the United States.

People interested in naval history surely remember that the iron steamship "Yastreb" ("Hawk"), the corvette "America," the steamers "Amur" and "Lena," the schooner "Bambori," the troo-ships "Yaponetz" ("Japanese"), "Manchur," "Gilyak," and "Sakhalin"—were all launched in this country and faithfully served the Imperial Navy for many years. In Russian America—the Russian possession in future Alaska—many fine ships, the product of American genius, were stationed. The screw-steamers "Emperor Alexander II," and "Grand-Duke Constantin," the wheel-steamers "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Baranov," the sailing-ships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Nakhimov," the brig "G. D. Constantin," and many others—were all built in New York or Massachusetts.

American engineers, on their part, made several trips to Russia with the objective of introducing there the Morse telegraph, although a kind of telegraph—"magnetic," as it was then called—had already been in operation in Russia since 1837.

Russia did by no means lack her own inventions and achievements, some of which were adopted by America. Russian block-wood pavements, for instance, literally covered the United States, after some enterprising American travellers who, impressed in Russia by this

innovation, had introduced it into their own country. Soon this method of road-paving was taken over by Canada. Russian block-wood pavements, in the words of an American writer, "girded the roads of Illinois and the deserts of the Middle-Western States."

When the war between Russia and Turkey broke out, four beautiful cruisers were built in this country for Russia—the "Asia," "Africa," "Europe," and "Zabiyaka" ("Quarrelsome")—vessels of historic importance for the Russian Navy, for they became the training-school for scores of naval officers.

There is nothing astonishing in the fact that Russia regarded American achievements in shipbuilding with admiration. This country was the first to develop a type of high-speed clippers and frigates, and also the first to build turreted monitors. Of European countries, Russia was the first to follow the transatlantic example, and within one year, 1863, no less than eighteen monitors were built in the dockyards of St. Petersburg. This was mainly due to the efforts of Admiral Lesovsky, who, in 1862, had visited America together with naval engineer Arteulov.

No less closely did Russia watch American progress in the manufacture of arms. Shortly before the Crimean war, Captain Lilienfeld of the Russian General Staff arrived here on a secret mission. He purchased a number of weapons from Samuel Colt, the well-known arms manufacturer: Colt revolvers, rifles, gunpowder—and brought this cargo, concealed in flour-sacks, safely to port in Russia.

But the most important mission was probably that of Colonel A. P. Gorlov of the Russian General Staff.

Some time after the Crimean war, the Russian government decided to modernize the equipment of the Russian Army and Navy. The carbine rifle had become obsolete, and was to be replaced by some new model. The question arose as to the country in which the new rifles should be ordered. England, as a hostile country, was, of course, eliminated. Nor were France's inimical actions during the war of 1854-55 forgotten. Prussia and Austria, while neutral, had also supported the enemy in the recent campaign and were likewise rejected.

So the choice fell upon the only friendly nation—the United States of America. In January, 1868, Colonel Gorlov, accompanied by Captain I. K. Gunius, left St. Petersburg for America on a secret mission.

Upon their arrival in New York, the two officers got in touch with the Russian Embassy in Washington, which referred them to the

Colt firm, whose president, Samuel Colt, welcomed them most cordially in Hartford, Connecticut.

Soon a meeting was arranged between them and a general of the U. S. Army who had already acquired a reputation as inventor of various devices to perfect small firearms. The most remarkable of his inventions was the "breech-lock"—a mechanism closing the breech of a rifle.

Without hesitation, Gorlov and Gunius selected the general's model and gave him an order for 30,000 rifles. The name of the American was Hiram Berdan.¹

When a name had to be found for the new Russian weapon, Colonel Gorlov there and then baptised it "Berdanka." And as "Berdanka" the new rifle started its glorious career in the service of the Russian armed forces—a career that lasted exactly half a century.

General Berdan was an unusual personality.

He was a staunch American patriot, and at the same time a devoted friend of Russia. After a stay in that country, he came not only to love it but—what is rare—to understand it. He often denounced the slanderous lies about Russia which even in those faraway times were being spread in America and England by certain elements hostile to their native country. He knew better than to believe them, and upon his return to America with his Russian wife, he never failed to stand up for the Great Empire on every occasion.

As commander of a regiment called after him the "Berdan Rifles," he saw active service throughout the Civil War; and he always acknowledged the importance of the factual and moral support given by Russia to the United States during the bitter years of that war.

Strange as it may seem, General Berdan's name seems completely forgotten in his own country. Russia is probably one of the few

¹Hiram Berdan (1823-1893). One of his early inventions was a "mechanical bakery," which was put in operation in five cities. The bakers' union, however, would not allow the machine to be used. During the Civil War, Berdan turned his attention to the construction of firearms. In 1861, he was commissioned colonel in the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, and for Gettysburg, he received the brevet of major-general, March 13, 1865. Shortly afterwards, he went to Russia to superintend the manufacture of his sharpshooting rifles. He is also credited with the invention of torpedoes and torpedo boats designed to evade nets. "The last ten years of General Berdan's life were occupied in modeling and perfecting what he styled his twin-screwed, armored, semi-submarine gunboat." See *The Biographical Dictionary of America*. 1906 [Ed.]

places where he was remembered long after his death, and his brief biography was included in the *Russian Encyclopedia*.

It is interesting to note, by the way, that his daughter—who was, of course, half-Russian—married the well-known Russian diplomat Baron Mohrenheim, Minister to Denmark and later Ambassador to France, who witnessed all the vicissitudes of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892.

The first shipment of "Berdankas" was delivered in March, 1870. The rifle proved so satisfactory that new orders followed in rapid succession.

After the first "Berdankas," a shipment of Farrington guns reached Russia. These were later mounted on the naval battery commanded by the young aide-de-camp, S. O. Makarov, the future famous admiral. During the Turkestan campaign, so brilliantly conducted by General Skobelev in 1880, the Farrington guns won well-deserved fame.

In addition to the "Berdankas," Russia bought still another type of American weapon—the Gatling gun. The name of Gorlov was stamped on these firearms and they became known as "Gorlovkas." They "saw action" in the Caucasus, in European Russia, and in Asia—where they played an important part in the taking of Khiva.

In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Russian Army was equipped both with "Berdankas" and "Gorlovkas," and the taking of Plevna can be largely credited to the excellent fighting qualities of these American firearms.

Russia further placed an order for Smith & Wesson revolvers in the United States. Two hundred thousand of these were delivered to her in 1871.²

Nor did the Russian Navy lag behind with orders for new arms. In 1871, Lieutenant Weitzenberg of the Navy was sent to America on a special mission. He ordered here revolvers of the Galland system and rifles of the Evans model. These arms were secretly carried to Russia by the ships she bought in Philadelphia in 1878—the "Africa," the "Asia," and others.

Captain Gunius soon went back to Russia, while Colonel Gorlov

²It is interesting to note that Russia was the first country to introduce telephones in the Armies. On December 3/15, 1877, the magazine "*Vsemirnaya Illustratsiya*" informed its readers that "Russia had ordered American telephones for the use of her armies"; and General Francis V. Greene, the American Military Attaché, was amazed to find telephones in the Russian Army—"invented the year before by an American named Alexander Graham Bell."

stayed on in this country and was appointed the first Russian military attaché on the staff of the Russian Embassy in Washington. He died in 1905 in Russia, at a great age.

In the seventies, the first rumblings of war were heard in the Balkans. The smell of gunpowder was in the air.

Russia, aware that sooner or later she would have to take up arms for her brother Slavs under Turkish yoke, feverishly began to prepare for war. Cartridges for the amount of two million dollars were ordered from a munitions plant in Connecticut. At the same time, steps were taken towards the establishment of plants for the manufacture of arms in Russia.

An American colonel, Benton, who visited Russia in 1873, stressed in his report to Washington that he had found Russian machinery and the production of arms in general in excellent condition. "Their machines," reported the colonel, "are in no way inferior to our own. Both as to type and to system of production they are superb." He noted further that the Russians were using machine tools made in Waterbury, Connecticut.

All this was largely the result of the activities of Colonel Baron P. A. Bilderling, who had visited the United States, and, upon his return, had devoted his efforts to the introduction of American technical devices and methods in Russia. From 1871 to 1884, he directed the Eshevsky arms-making plant where, in collaboration with Nobel, the well-known oil magnate, he produced over 200,000 "Berdankas."

Colonel Gorlov—who had so brilliantly acquitted himself of his mission to America—was entrusted with many troublesome tasks during those years.

The war with Turkey broke out in 1877. England formally protested to the United States with regard to Russian orders for military supplies. It is to the credit of this country that these remonstrances were disregarded, and the stream of American supplies to the Russian Army and Navy was never stopped throughout the campaign.

Colonel Gorlov tirelessly toured American industrial towns—Bridgeport, Waterbury, Hartford, Providence—where the machines were humming, producing the arms which were to play such an important part in the liberation of the Slavic nations of the Balkans.

In 1871, these same plants were visited also by the Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, son of Alexander II, the Emancipator.

Such is, briefly sketched, the part played by the United States in

the equipment of the Russian armed forces. This valuable help could have been given only by a nation friendly towards Russia—whose past services it had not forgotten.

In 1914, Russia once again looked to America for technical help. Scores of Russian munitions experts appeared in this country, and history repeated itself once again. In Connecticut alone, over 2,000 Russians were supervising the Russian orders for military equipment of all kinds.

Finally, a quarter of a century later, in World War II, Russia, now known as U.S.S.R., turned again to America for help; but that is another chapter in the history of Russian-American relations. The present article is offered merely as a tribute to General Hiram Berdan, one of the real American friends of Russia and the Russian people.

Public Opinion in the Soviet Union

BY J. A. BROWN, JR.

THE common assumption that there is no such thing as public opinion in the Soviet Union is misleading,¹ and rests on a serious misconception of the term itself. Although public opinion has been defined as many things by many people,² it is generally taken to mean an attitude shared by some significant section of the community on a controversial issue. It is surely incorrect to reason that because the citizens of the Soviet Union cannot make all their views and opinions heard, and because they do not publicly engage in internal ideological warfare, that they do not think, and share their thoughts. The tendency to deny the existence of public opinion in the Soviet Union springs from the obvious fact that public opinion in the Soviet Union is a strictly limited public opinion quite unlike the free-flowing public opinion of the West.

Just as there is a tendency to deny the existence of public opinion in the Soviet Union, there is a tendency to confuse public expression of opinion and public opinion. Astute observers point out that public opinion is ". . . the object of more solicitude on the part of the Kremlin than any other aspect of Soviet life with the single exception of national defense and security."³ The elaborate effort made by the Communist Party to control public opinion must be interpreted not as a denial of public opinion but as recognition of it, and of the fact that the cooperation of the public is most economically secured in a climate of favorable public opinion.

Within the Soviet Union the channels through which public opinion flows have been formalized, and the Communist Party, through its instrument, the press, clearly encourages public expression of opinion on a limited field of subjects. This is not to say that one can only publicly express his views on unimportant and

¹See Hans von Eckardt, *Russia* (New York: 1932), p. 581, for a typical assertion by a careful scholar. Dr. von Eckardt writes: ". . . no such thing as opinions were to be allowed." The editors of the *Public Opinion Quarterly* quote Professor Harold Laski as having stated that Stalin, before making a decision, need only convince his colleagues of the Politburo (Spring, 1947), p. 6.

²See Harwood L. Childs, *An Introduction to Public Opinion* (New York: 1940), pp. 35-48.

³The editors of the *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring, 1947), p. 6.

non-controversial things. Many issues which have been open for long and protracted public debate are serious issues. The 1937 reversal of the official Communist doctrine on divorce and abortions was discussed long and thoroughly in the press, with a majority of the expressions of opinion cast against the policy the government adopted.

The staggered five-day week stirred up a storm of protest and lamentation in the press. The reversal of this policy and the consequent return to the general weekly holiday on the same day may or may not have been in obedience to this public expression of opinion.⁴ Cynics may assume that the masters of the press, knowing full well that the decision to reverse the official policy had been made, ordered a press-generated demand for just such action. It is also possible to assume that a careful evaluation of this public reaction to an unpopular policy which was not working served to explain the policy's failure to the managers of the Soviet system, and convinced them that to persist in implementation of a policy so unpopular would cost more than a reversal of policy, in economic and social terms.

The line beyond which the citizen must not go in his criticism and discussion is a line which shifts with changes in domestic tranquility and international relations. Although a shifting line, it is a reasonably discernible one at all times. Soviet citizens are well aware that criticism and even friendly discussion which would weaken the basic system will not be tolerated. *Pravda*, the official instrument of the Communist Party, on June 22, 1936, commented upon the freedom-of-the-press guarantee in the 1936 Constitution (Article 125):

Whoever postulates the overthrow of the Socialist regime is an enemy of the people. He will not obtain a sheet of paper, he will not be able to cross the threshold of a printing office, should he try to fulfill his wretched purpose. He will not find a hall, a room, or a mere corner in which to spread his poison by speech.⁵

The newspaper *Izvestia* on August 6, 1936, also had information which aided the Soviet citizen in reaching some conclusions as to how far he could go in his remarks:

Liberty will be accorded to everybody except those whose acts and ideas oppose the interests of the workers, and those whose object is to demolish the

⁴See H. D. Harben, *Russian Quiz* (London: 1947), p. 36 for a statement that the governmental reversal was directly due to this wave of protest.

⁵This excerpt is part of a quotation of greater length in N. de Basily, *Russia Under Soviet Rule* (London: 1938), pp. 183-4.

Socialist regime. No lunatics will be able to hold meetings; neither will criminals, monarchists, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc.⁶

In his monumental treatise on Soviet Law, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky states that anti-socialist remarks are indeed illegal:

In our state, naturally, there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press, and so on for the foes of Socialism. Every sort of attempt on their part to utilize to the detriment of the State—that is to say, to the detriment of all the toilers—these freedoms granted to the toilers must be classified as a counter-revolutionary crime to which Article 58, Paragraph 10, or one of the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code is applicable.⁷

A careful analysis of over sixty letters chosen at random from letters to the editors of the leading Soviet newspapers available in this country reveals no single letter which deviates seriously from the official Soviet policy in the month of April, 1949, the month during which the North Atlantic Treaty played such a prominent part in the news. No Soviet citizen, to the knowledge of this writer, has written to the editor of his favorite newspaper advocating the lifting of the Berlin blockade, or urging the resumption of friendly relations with Tito.

One group of students of the Soviet Union would explain this absence of criticism by fear of the consequences. Of course, there is some truth to this. The Soviet system, as we have shown, does not tolerate deviationism. Another would attribute it to the simple fact, and certainly a true fact, that an editor would not publish such a letter. There is a third factor, not as frequently discussed, which must be taken into consideration. The homogeneity of Soviet thinking, especially regarding political issues, is a phenomenon difficult to understand by those of us who live in a culture which rewards diversity and independent thought. It partly explains the absence of the kind of criticism which we feel is a prerequisite to a free press. This monotonous, and to us, strange oneness has been the subject of much speculation.

Mr. Edward Crankshaw writes:

. . . when discussing these matters, such as conceptions of democracy, with Russians, the answer you receive from one is the answer you receive from *all*, excluding a peripheral fringe of concealed opposition among the heirs to the Tsarist intelligentsia and a proportion of elderly peasants, but not excluding a considerable, but apparently swiftly dwindling, number of Russian patriots

⁶These remarks were published over the signature of G. Katanian, and are also quoted *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁷*The Law of the Soviet State* (New York: 1948), p. 617.

who take no stock in the present Kremlin government. *All Russians.* And in their replies there will be no variation at all, no individual slants and sidelights on the overall flat statement, and no sign of glimmering comprehension of another point of view. *All Russians.* Which means that when you have talked politics with one Russian you have talked politics with the lot. And so perfectly conditioned are they, that even if one or another of them disagrees most violently with this or that policy or measure and, in conversation, ventures to express disagreement (which happens perhaps more often than you would think), it never occurs to him to question the system which forbids him to proselytise his views.⁸

The Soviet citizen, denied the luxury of criticizing the system and major policy decisions after they have been announced, is protected by law in his endeavor to criticize the local petty tyrants which infest any bureaucracy, the management of his collective farm, the red tape and confusion surrounding his daily life, fellow citizens who do not live up to the demands and responsibilities of citizenship and on occasion even the Communist bosses in his locality. His criticism in this area is generally directed through the press, which has among its functions that of serving as a sort of go-between for the citizen and his government. He may confer with the editor personally; editors hold frequent press-reader conferences for this purpose. He may write a letter to the editor of his paper, knowing that Soviet law requires that his complaint be investigated and that he will be protected from persecution for having made it.⁹

Soviet courts are directed by the Commissariat of Justice to listen to the voice of the people as reflected in the press. Editors must explain their handling of complaints to the judges, and they must issue a quarterly report to the presidium of the Supreme Court of their republic regarding these complaints.¹⁰ Representatives of the press who divulge the names of persons who send letters to their newspapers are liable to criminal prosecution as violators of the Criminal Code.¹¹

Pravda and the other large newspapers maintain large staffs to sort and analyze their mail. This mail is handled with the assumption that the citizen has a right to criticize, and that the press has

⁸Edward Crankshaw, *Russia and the Russians* (London: 1947), pp. 144-5.

⁹"Editors are herewith ordered to supervise personally the letter departments. Letters . . . must be immediately published and sent for investigation." *Resheniya parti i o pechati*, p. 162 (quoted in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1947, p. 123).

¹⁰For a fuller statement of these basic facts see Professor John Hazard's chapters on the Soviet Union in Fritz M. Marx, *Foreign Governments* (New York: 1949), especially pp. 501-502.

¹¹See Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

an obligation and responsibility to use this criticism¹² so as to continually prod the bureaucrat and the inefficient public servant into better efforts.

It is clear that ". . . the press is ultimately the organ of the Communist Party, and not of the State, so that it is allowed—is bound, indeed—to keep a watch over the latter and criticize it and on occasion to pour bitter contempt upon it, to combat the bureaucratization of the machine and the abuse of power, and ruthlessly to expose malicious obstruction of its work, while unreservedly subordinating itself to the Party."¹³

The mechanism by which the press serves to check bureaucratic inefficiency and inattention to the needs of the citizen, in addition to the letters-to-the-editor device in the larger newspapers, includes the whole worker-peasant correspondent movement (*Rabselkor*)¹⁴ and the factory and collective farm wall-newspaper.

Why, asked *Pravda*, should we send reporters to the village to write about you peasants? Write about yourselves. Never mind if you are semi-literate and must use capital letters or "chicken-marks." Start that way and you may end a columnist. But don't send in such items as "Ivan beat up Manka" or "A new well has been dug on Petrov's farm." All that you see in nature or life that gives joy or pain to your heart; all our successes and all our sad failures. Proletarians and peasants, to pen and ink!¹⁵

The exact number of worker-peasant correspondents enrolled in *Rabselkor* is difficult to determine. The requirements for participation are generally fulfilled by anyone able to read and write. The urge to self-expression, which is certainly not limited to the Soviet Union, had enrolled close to 5,000,000 correspondents by 1937 if one counts "army," "air," "child," and "photo" as well as "worker-peasant" correspondents.¹⁶

This army of observers pours great waves of material upon the Soviet press. Much of it is critical; some is expressive of pride in achievement. A letter from a *Pravda* correspondent which was featured in that newspaper on June 15, 1946, may serve to demon-

¹²See Isidor Schneider, "The Soviet Press," *Soviet Russia Today*, February, 1940, for an evaluation of the concept of freedom within limits which would probably be in agreement with the evaluation a Soviet citizen would make.

¹³Von Eckardt, *op. cit.*, p. 582.

¹⁴See Albert Rhys Williams, *The Soviets* (New York: 1937) p. 351 ff., for a discussion of this movement.

¹⁵Quoted *ibid.*, p. 351, from *Pravda*.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 352.

strate the emphasis upon "criticism and self-criticism,"¹⁷ and will demonstrate the fact that the Party units themselves may come in for serious criticism. Portions of the letter¹⁸ follow:

In Buriat Mongolia the foundations for a substantial increase in future agricultural production have been firmly laid. In past years, however, the local party and soviet organs have been unable to consolidate the progress already achieved, and have relaxed their control over the agricultural economy.

The nominal, formal leadership of the collective farms (*kolkhozy*) and the machine tractor stations (MTS), has led to sad consequences: the productivity of grain culture has sharply reduced, cattle raising decreased, and not a few animals died of hunger. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (*Obkom*) of Buriat Mongolia, has planned concrete measures for the improvement of agriculture in the republic. The Buriat Mongolian *Obkom*, however, has not made a genuine effort to put these instructions into practice.

The party, soviet, and land organs of the republic do not know and make no real effort to learn what is going on in the *kolkhozy* and in the MTS.

The letter discusses a plan proposed by a citizen of Buriat Mongolia, and although it had been proved effective, ignored officially by the *Obkom*. It continues:

... perhaps the Ministry of Agriculture of the republic has recommended to the *kolkhozy* more effective methods for the improvement of the meadows? Nothing of the sort! . . .

What is the cause of this? Is it a lack of common sense or an inability to grasp the crux of the problem?

The Buriat Mongolian *Obkom* is not providing for the future of the agricultural economy of the republic. . . .

The insufficient information of the *Obkom* in agricultural matters and the absence of genuine party control have been utilized by unpatriotic elements for their own selfish ends. . . .

Not one of these criticisms was heeded in the decisions of the plenum. Such being the case, why did the members of the plenum make speeches? After gathering they proposed a plan of action which consisted in essence of the report of the secretary of the *Obkom*, a report very sparing in its self-criticism. Both in the report and in the plan conditions in the republic were painted in rosy colors: "Definite progress has been achieved. The situation has been improved . . .," etc.

This plan was approved without any substantial changes, although corrections and additions were needed.

¹⁷This phrase, criticism and self-criticism, is a favorite of Soviet leaders. See the excellent article, "Criticism and Self-Criticism—Law of Development of Soviet Society," *Bolshevik*, March 15, 1948.

¹⁸The entire letter is available in English in *Soviet Press Translations*, Volume I, No. I, October 31, 1946. I have used this effective translation in the quotation above.

Such a practice is typical of the work of this bureau of the *Obkom*. The plenum of the *Obkom* does not heed the voices of the most active members. A man speaks out once, twice, and then for a long time relapses into silence. What's the use, he says, to speak, if your criticism does not reach the ears of the leaders? Practical proposals are ignored.

Indifference and formalism reign. . . .

Formalism, conceit, inattention to warnings from the field, pervade the entire activity of the Buriat Mongolian *Obkom* and its first secretary, Comrade Kudriavtsev. . . .

The run-of-the-mill correspondent does not speak with the authority and ability demonstrated by the writer of the above letter. His complaints are often trivial;¹⁹ his writing childish; his attitude petulant or boastful.²⁰ He has a definite status-consciousness and rarely does a letter or article turn up seriously criticizing high officials unless it is written by an important person. He is local minded in his criticism, rarely criticizing or commenting about matters far removed. His criticism provides a wealth of information for those who would understand the Soviet system, and those who wish to evaluate its successes and failures. It takes the place, to a degree, of the opposition press, and often exposes situations requiring court action.²¹

The wall-newspaper, which is a feature of all Soviet factories, *kolkhozy*, public institutions, governmental offices and places of employment in which a sizeable group comes together, are another avenue which the citizen may use to protest actions of his fellow workers, foremen, technicians, and the managers or directors.²²

To suggest that the wall-newspapers are directly influential in policy determination is to go beyond the evidence available to this writer. It is clear, however, that the local managers and party

¹⁹A student of the Russian press is impressed with the "triviality" of many of their articles, while they are impressed by the "triviality" of ours. An example of the kind of article is the following, from *Pravda*, January 12, 1949: "Sverdlovsk, January 11, 1949. The Aramilsk Cloth Factory of the Sverdlovsk Region has shifted to the production of cloth of better quality. The manufacture of black, blue, and colored 'Ural' cheviot, as well as pilot cloth and drape material, has begun; the production of 'Ural' blankets has been mastered."

²⁰See Harry Schwartz, "Ivan Writes to the Editor," *New York Times Magazine*, March 27, 1949, for an interesting and typical collection of five letters, or Harrison E. Salisbury, "Sports and Toys Engage Russians," *New York Times*, May 27, 1949.

²¹Soviet newspapers publish from time to time "exposure" figures in what looks like a kind of competition to determine the championship.

²²See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization* (London: 1944), 3rd edition, p. 633 for an interesting discussion of wall-newspapers.

leaders pay close attention to the expression of opinion in the wall-newspapers, and that the citizen can use them in protesting petty tyrannies and injustices which take place at his place of employment. The employment practices of his plant are likely to be influenced to some degree by this medium for the expression of private opinions, and when the private opinions coincide so that their aggregate is a clearly observable public opinion, managers and foremen can hardly ignore all of them.

Our observation of the press in the Soviet Union leads us to conclude that there is a very close, and legally recognized, relation between the press and the reader. This relationship clearly serves the interests of the Party in its desire to rule with a maximum of public support, and it serves, to a degree, the interests of the reader who wants to influence policy, and who has no opposition party to turn to. The press serves as a kind of gigantic complaint bureau through which the citizen may apply for relief, and which publicizes "criticism and self-criticism," the task of which is "the merciless exposure of the weaknesses in our work in order to improve our construction and strengthen the Soviet Government."²³ This criticism must not come ". . . from the other side of the barricades," and must not tend ". . . to weaken the Soviet Government."²⁴

The press is, then, in a sense the servant of the people, and often serves as a ". . . court of last resort for those who encounter red-tape in trying to adjust complaints."²⁵ It is in no sense available for agitation against the Socialist State, and indeed is used as a preventive against diversionist and nonconformist views.

The public policy makers keep a close watch on the press and the limited expression of public opinion to be found in it, but quite clearly they are not bound by public opinion. As evidenced by the marriage-divorce-abortion debate, neither do the policy makers always deny the press the privilege of voicing a public opinion contrary to the policy which they have decided to adopt. Once policy is adopted, with few exceptions, the debate is closed, and all organs for the expression of public opinion speak as with a single voice.

²³*Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition* (Moscow: 1933), pp. 39-40.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵"The Soviet Press," *Bulletin on the Soviet Union* (published by the American-Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc.), August 5, 1938.

The Circular Frontier of Muscovy

BY VALENTINE TSCHEBOTARIOFF-BILL

FROM the earliest days of Russia's history, the concept of the frontier has played an important rôle in the life of the country. In the first phase of Russia's growth, in the days of the Principality of Kiev, Russia herself was a frontier region—the northern outpost of Byzantine culture and, at the same time, the southern borderland of Viking expansion. In the second phase of Russia's development, in the centuries of Tartar oppression, Russia became the western fringe of the vast Mongol empire.

It was in the third stage of Russian history, with the emergence of the state of Muscovy, that Russia began to develop as an independent entity, with frontier problems all her own.

In certain ways, the frontier of Muscovy resembled the American frontier. Both were regions rather than sharply drawn boundaries, regions of free or sparsely inhabited territory which had to be explored, conquered, colonized, and settled. In shape, however, Muscovy's frontier differed greatly from its American counterpart. Colonization of America began, roughly speaking, as a coastal development, as a string of settlements along the Atlantic coast. It proceeded as a gradual expansion of this coastal frontier westward.

Colonization of Muscovy, on the other hand, began from the center of the Russian plain, as a cluster of settlements in the circular enclosure formed by the Upper Volga and its tributary, the Oka. From this center, the Russian frontier expanded in all four directions, in circular fashion. The straight and slender shape of the American frontier produced a singleness of purpose, a uniformity of design, which was entirely lacking in the expansion of Russia's circular frontier. The purpose of America's westward drive was, all along the line, the conquest of free or sparsely settled land and its conversion to productive use. Russia's circular expansion, on the other hand, presents a multitude of motivations and purposes. The rôle of the northern frontier stood in sharp contrast to the function of the southern borderlands. And the aspects of the eastern territories differed greatly from the setting of the western region.

The northern frontier was the oldest, in the sense that its geographical limit, the waters of the Arctic ocean, was reached as far

as the Muscovite period of Russian history and its long and painful prelude of Tartar domination is concerned—earlier than were the geographical barriers or political borderlines in the other directions, long before the northern shore of the Black Sea was incorporated into the Russian Empire or the Pacific was reached in the East. The wild, densely forested northern frontier regions reaching to the shores of the White Sea were explored as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, possibly even earlier, by trappers and pioneers from Novgorod in search of fur-bearing animals, the principal item of Novgorod's export to the commercial cities of northern Europe.

But the North was not only the oldest frontier. It also became the frontier of contrasts. Contrasting were the functions which the North performed and contrasting were the social groups which it produced. The two contrasting functions lay in the fact, that the North provided space and ground for religious pursuits, but it also opened possibilities for commercial activities. People who wanted to escape from this world and to lead a life of seclusion and pious meditation, went north. But people who sought profit and engaged in trade, also appeared in this region.

The religious function of the North goes back to the fourteenth century—to the time when the Tartar yoke was at its worst. It was then that people's thoughts turned to religion, that the desire for seclusion and retreat from the secular world was widespread and acute. Since the Tartars came from the South and Southeast, and the West presented an inimical and alien front, the North was the only region open for retreat. This region witnessed the growth of monasticism and the widespread establishment of so-called "desert" monasteries. Due to the predominance of forests in this part of the country, a desert, "*pustynia*," meant to the Russians of those days a thickly wooded, uninhabited, wasteland and not a bare stretch of territory devoid of vegetation.

The foundation of a desert monastery was customarily laid by a hermit monk who retreated northward and built a log cabin in the forested wilderness. In time, he was joined by other hermits, and gradually the settlement grew into a monastic community. This seldom failed to attract peasant cultivators who settled in the vicinity of the monastery, which thus became the center of a self-sufficient economic unit.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, the monk, as the leading representative of the northern frontier, and the peasant who followed him, were joined by a very different figure—the merchant.

Europe's interest in exploring overseas regions was at that time very keen. The English were searching for a northern route to China. In a storm, their ships were driven into a bay of the White Sea near the mouth of the northern Dvina. They presented themselves in Moscow at the Court of Ivan the Terrible, and succeeded in establishing trade relations with Muscovy.

Although Russian merchants had exploited the vast resources of the North in fur bearing animals long before the appearance of the English, it was now that the region became the leading trade route of Muscovy. The American frontier has been called "the meeting place of civilization and savagery." The reverse was true in Russia—the northern frontier was the meeting place of Russian backwardness with European progress. Archangel was founded at the mouth of the northern Dvina and a string of trading towns developed along the route to Moscow.

Yet the influence of the English on Muscovy was regional rather than social. It did not revolutionize the set and rigid traditions of thought and life of feudal Muscovy. For an elaborate set of rules and provisions was devised by Ivan the Terrible to prevent free and close contact between the English and the Russian people. Above all, trade with England did not contribute to the development of a merchant class in Muscovy. One of the peculiarities of the country which struck the English most, was the small number of professional merchants, and the fact that all other classes of the population engaged in trade, when the opportunity presented itself. The Tsar himself was, according to the English, "the first merchant of Muscovy."

There were also geographical impediments to a free and continuous growth of Muscovy's trade with England. Archangel was ice-free only three months out of the year. So, when Petersburg was founded in the early eighteenth century, the commercial importance of the North declined abruptly. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the North was that it was a marginal frontier. The soil was poor, the climate severe, and communication and transportation difficult. The marginal quality explains why this frontier brought together such contrasting representatives as the monk and the trader. Both chose the northern route by necessity, because no better way presented itself for such varied pursuits as retreat from the secular world and contact with Western civilization.

In contrast to the marginal quality of the North, the southern frontier was the frontier of abundance, the no man's land of rich,

fertile, open steppes. For Muscovy had not yet expanded into the open black soil belt of the South. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this region began to be settled by peasant fugitives from Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania, fleeing from oppression and a heavy burden of taxation. The fugitives organized Cossack communities in the steppes, those escaping from Poland-Lithuania in the lower Dnieper, those coming from Muscovy on the lower Don.

Cossack was not a racial term, but a symbol of freedom. For the Cossacks were fugitives from oppression, and what they cherished most was freedom. Unlike most types of emigrants, the Cossacks did not try to reproduce as closely as possible the world they left behind—a world which they left with bitterness and resentment in their hearts. They did not arrive in the steppes equipped with tools and belongings stowed away in a covered wagon. Their flight was illegal. They had little beyond the clothes on their backs. But the hardships of their flight, the length of the distance to be covered in order to reach the Cossack camps, meant that those who safely reached their destination, were picked in strength and courage, tempered and tested in the hardships of their flight.

The Cossack organization was not patterned after contemporary Muscovy or contemporary Poland, where popular freedom was on the wane. It was fashioned after certain aspects of an older model—the Principality of Kiev, long destroyed, but living in the memory of the people as a golden era of freedom and heroic adventures. In those remote days of the tenth and eleventh centuries, people had actively participated in governmental affairs through the institution of popular assemblies.

It was this principle of democratic government, which disappeared in Russia with the fall of Kiev, that was revived by the Cossacks. They elected a "Hetman" or "Ataman" for a limited period of time, who was strictly obeyed while in office, but could be dismissed at any time through popular vote cast in popular assembly.

The Cossacks supported themselves, in those days of their independence, by hunting and fishing rather than by agricultural pursuits. But their primary skill and occupation was warfare—raids and military expeditions against Muscovy, Poland, remnants of the Tartar bands in the Crimea, and against the Turks who controlled most of the shores of the Black Sea.

Muscovy's southern frontier was thus primarily the frontier of freedom, haven of the oppressed. The Cossacks supplied the leaders of the greatest popular uprisings and revolts against serfdom and

oppression. The South performed a function comparable to the rôle of cities in Europe. In Europe, serfdom was connected with the growth and decline of city life. European serfdom grew in the intermediary period between the decline of city life under the later Roman Empire and its rebirth after the Crusades. European cities contributed most to the disappearance of medieval serfdom. For within the walls of a city, freedom ceased to be the monopoly of a privileged class of nobles and became the natural right of all urban inhabitants. Europe became a region of cities long before it developed into a region of national states. But Muscovy grew in a manner which did not permit the Russian towns to play the rôle of privileged autonomous bodies.

Novgorod's independence was crushed at the very onset of Moscow's rise to statehood. And the commercial towns which flourished along Moscow's northern trade route in the second half of the sixteenth century developed *after* the state of Muscovy was fully established and were, therefore, subordinated to the central Muscovite authority. While in medieval Europe people seeking to escape bondage fled to the cities, in Russia they fled to the southern frontier and the Cossack communities beyond it. For the Russian towns could not promote personal freedom.

Cossack independence came to an end during the eighteenth century, when the boundary line of the Russian state was slowly advanced southward. The Cossacks retained certain privileges after their incorporation into the Russian Empire, but their autonomy was ended. During that same century of diminishing Cossack freedom, Russian serfdom attained the peak of its development.

Both the northern and the southern frontiers were typified by representative social groups—monks and merchants in the North, Cossacks in the South. In the eastern borderlands of the sixteenth century we find as yet the absence of any definite social groups which could be called typical of this frontier. As yet, the lonely figures of isolated individuals rise on the vast horizon of Siberia—the family of the Stroganovs, and the adventurer Yermak.

The Stroganovs were originally merchants from Novgorod—merchants of exceptional shrewdness and enterprise. The family migrated eastward in the fifteenth century, attracted by the salt lakes and fur-bearing animals of northeastern Russia. Salt was very rare in those days in Muscovy, and in great demand due to the limited means of food preservation. The Stroganovs accumulated a fortune as salt boilers, supplying the domestic economy with this

vital item, and later in the sixteenth century, as fur traders with the English.

The Stroganovs received a charter from Ivan the Terrible conferring upon them a long-term right of possession and administration of vast stretches of territory on both sides of the Ural, extending as far eastward as the river Ob. Part of this territory had to be conquered from the Tartars—a task which was performed by the Cossack Yermak and his men.

Yermak was a daring, adventurous lad who escaped oppression in Muscovy, and fled to the southern steppes, whence, with a band of followers, he made his way to the Ural and the Stroganov domain. Yermak became a popular figure and a legendary hero of the Russian people. The legend of his death is particularly significant, revealing those features of his life which made him so dear to the Russian people. In recognition of his services, so the story goes, Yermak received a suit of heavy plated armor from Ivan the Terrible. Once, wounded in battle with the Tartars, Yermak tried to escape by swimming across a river, but the heavy armor which he wore dragged him to the bottom and he drowned. Reckless independence and proud individualism—of which there was so little inside Muscovy—were the virtues for which the Russians loved and admired the rugged frontiersman and pioneer. For it was the acceptance of an official favor, the recognition of state authority, which proved fatal for Yermak.

The Stroganovs and Yermak being the lonely representatives of the eastern frontier in sixteenth century Muscovy, the East was as yet the frontier of the future, destined to play an important rôle in the nineteenth and even more so in the twentieth century.

The West, however, was the frontier of Russia's past. After the dissolution of the Principality of Kiev in the twelfth century, most of the territory west of the Dnieper route fell to Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. The eastern frontier of Europe was no longer Russia, but Poland-Lithuania, which took part in the cultural and economic development of the West, while Russia bore the Tartar yoke and was thrown back in her development.

The memory of Kiev's bloom and prosperity was preserved by the Russian people like a beautiful dream. Gone was the easy access to the sea, the profitable trade routes, the prosperous commercial centers. Gone was the people's participation in governmental affairs. Whenever the Russians paused on the hard and grim road which they entered upon with the invasion of the Tartars, they

looked back longingly upon these elements of lost freedom and prosperity.

So then, the recovery of this lost territory in the West became one of the major objectives of Muscovy. In the late fifteenth century Muscovy opened her policy of westward expansion by overrunning independent Novgorod. Novgorod's upper class of wealthy land-owning boyars and merchants was exterminated or exiled and a large portion of their landed property used to build up a protective wall of militia settlements along the frontier adjacent to Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. At the time, land played an important part in Muscovy's defensive system. A few standing regiments entered into the composition of the army, but the largest portion of military units was based on land holding, in very much the same fashion as the feudal defenses had been organized in medieval Europe. Muscovy used the land along the threatened frontiers for the organization of a landed militia, which tilled the soil in times of peace and took up arms in times of war. The land distributed among the military servitors, known as *dvoriane* (from the word *dvor*—court or household), remained the property of the state. Like the European fief, land tenure was conditional and temporary, depending in each individual case on the duration of military service.

Centuries of battles with the Tartars had left their mark on Muscovy's art of war. Like the Tartars, Muscovy's army in the sixteenth century was mostly on horseback, equipped with bow and arrow, saber and lance. It was mobile and daring, but not capable of long persistent resistance. To a western observer of the day the boldly charging Muscovite cavalry seemed to be saying to the enemy: "Retreat or we will flee." These tactics were successful in the East against the remnants of the Tartar horde, but not against the professional mercenary troops of Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. These were already equipped with firearms and showed less and less inclination to retreat.

This is why the western frontier of Muscovy did not produce any typical representatives, either social groups or individuals. The West was the frontier of the entire Muscovite state. The collective efforts of the Muscovite population as a whole were directed toward a westward expansion. These efforts were so all-absorbing and yet remained unsuccessful, because Russia's western neighbors were culturally and militarily more advanced.

Muscovy's circular frontier presented, therefore, a multitude of problems and difficulties related to the domestic, internal conflicts

of the country, and added impetus to the forces of turmoil and disruption which increasingly beset Muscovy in the later part of the sixteenth century.

In the North, feudal mentality and rigid traditionalism prevented Muscovy from fully exploiting the advantages of commercial relations with England. In the South, a peasantry bitter and resentful at the heavy burden of taxation, was fleeing beyond the border of Muscovy, draining the labor supply of the central regions. The strength and military efforts of the state were concentrated in the West, where all attempts at expansion remained unsuccessful due to the backward, feudal organization of Muscovy's fighting forces. There were, thus, no resources, no strength left for an exploitation of the eastern regions, with all their natural riches and opportunities.

In the following centuries, the Russian frontiers greatly changed in function and appearance. But one feature they retained unaltered to this day—the simultaneous drive in different directions, with multifarious aims and motivations.

The Russian DPs

BY ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY

ALMOST five years passed since VE Day—the day when the Russian prisoners of war, refugees, forced laborers, wholeheartedly rejoiced and thanked God for their "liberation."

Forced labor, gas chambers, the atrocities of the Germans, such as history will never forget, were behind. A new life in free countries, that was what these people were hoping for, but their joy did not last long. Words which were worse than death itself, spread like wildfire throughout the camps: "Repatriation," "Yalta Agreement."

For once the great principles of the United States, expressed in the words of President Washington, who stated that "more and more a safe and propitious asylum for the unfortunates of other countries, would be given by the United States," were broken. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Russians were repatriated by force and sent back "home." These Soviet citizens knew only too well the horrors that were awaiting them in their country; they knew that even if they were not shot at once, they would be chained like criminals and sent to forced labor camps in the Arctic where for many months they would not see the rays of the sun and would finally die of exhaustion, malnutrition, and cold. . . . Many preferred committing suicide. But they were even deprived of this privilege. The prisoners were watched day and night. Knives, scissors, ropes, anything that they could use to commit suicide were taken away from them. Only a few succeeded in hanging themselves or opening their veins with razor blades.

Some three to four hundred thousand Soviet citizens succeeded in escaping. They hid in the forests of Germany and Austria, in the ruins of the cities, in the villages. Every one of these was eager to give up his country. Overnight they became Poles, Serbs, Ukrainians, or Balts.

Thousands of Soviet Russian DPs were kept in camps—Russian prisoners of war, former Soviet citizens who were taken for forced labor by the Germans, and those who fled from Russia with the retreating German army. These people did not mind living in the cold, crowded barracks, they did not feel the hunger—their only wish was to escape to freedom.

Soviet repatriation units were operating in all the zones of Ger-

many, Austria, and Italy, weeding out all the Soviet citizens. Every night Soviet armed units with tanks and machine guns surrounded the camps, arrested all the Soviet citizens, delivered them in truck-loads to the station, dumped them into armed cattle cars, and sent them over to Soviet Russia. Heartbreaking scenes took place: people committed suicide, threw themselves off the trains. . . . In one of the camps, the Russians were warned that the Repatriation Committee was to be expected in the morning. All night long the stoves in the barracks were burning—Soviet passports were turned into ashes. In the morning when the Repatriation Committee came to get their people, they did not find any Soviet citizens—they all had documents of different nationalities, except Russian. The Soviet officials understood very well that these papers were forged, but they had no way of proving that the people in the camps were citizens of the U.S.S.R., and the Americans refused to release them to the Communists.

These former Soviet citizens were afraid to register with UNRRA or the IRO and, therefore, the actual number of this category of "Russian Displaced Persons" is unknown. It is estimated that the number exceeded 400,000. In its report of 1948, the IRO gives the following nationality figures of DPs registered in Germany, Austria, and Italy:

Poland	254,000
Baltic countries	135,000
Ukraine	92,000
Yugoslavia	28,000
Rumania	15,000
Nansen status	14,000
Hungary	12,000
All others	50,000

The Russians were not even mentioned. It is understood that the Russians were included in the "others" and the "Nansen status," but even then the figure is far from being adequate.

The Russian DPs classified under the category of "Nansen status" are the Russian émigrés who fled from the Revolution of 1917 and who later on were given Nansen passports. About 35,000 Russian refugees who fled from Russia during the Revolution lived in different European countries: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Baltic states. Most of them succeeded in adjusting themselves. Professors, doctors, engineers, and other pro-

fessionals held good positions and had good homes. During the occupation of these countries by the Red army, they escaped and finally found themselves in the DP camps of Germany and Austria. Many of them have lost not only everything they possessed, but during the bombardment and their flight, many lost close relatives—sons, fathers, and mothers. Their fate is tragic. A great many of them are old, and no country will accept them. They have no future, no hope; and live with the bitter feeling that they are not needed anywhere.

IRO gives the figure of 505,000 resettled up to September, 1949, out of the approximately one and a quarter million DPs stranded in Germany, Austria, and Italy after VE Day, of all nationalities. The countries which received the largest number in the past 18 months include:

United Kingdom	81,000	United States	22,000
Palestine	74,000	Argentine	21,000
Canada	48,500	Australia	16,000
France	24,600	Venezuela	12,000
Belgium	22,000	Brazil	9,500

Since last October, 50,000 Displaced Persons were resettled in the U. S. A. in accordance with Bill S 2242—205,000 persons are to be admitted. Among these the percentage of Russian Greek Orthodox is exceedingly small.

Most of these countries, with the exception of the United States, which gives all the opportunities to the DPs, are interested in getting cheap labor. England has brought in miners and laborers and domestic help; Belgium has signed a two-year contract with mine workers; Brazil needs coffee growers. The condition of these DP workers is pitiful. For example, in Belgium the workers have no insurance, no medical help, and the pay is very low. At the end of the two-year contract, the miners are free to acquire other jobs; but no jobs are available and the refugees, some of whom are intellectuals, have to go on working in the mines for an indefinite period. No opportunities are given to the DPs in England.

A great many of the refugees leaked out from Germany and Austria into France; they are employed and have no legal status. In Lorraine, a number of Russian DPs are working in the mines. The percentage of deaths is extremely high—living quarters, food, and clothing are indescribably bad. There is no medical help, no schools for the children. A representative of the Tolstoy Foundation in France visited the miners and the matter was brought to the

attention of the French authorities. With the help of this representative, the children of the miners were placed in summer camps.

In Great Britain, the former DPs are not permitted to take the work which is offered them or to change their jobs of their own free will.

It is, therefore, understandable that the hope of every Displaced Person is to emigrate to the United States. Unfortunately, the Russian colony here is not very large and not too prosperous. It does what it can, but it has no means of providing jobs and housing for a large number of the less fortunate compatriots. Another difficulty is that the average native American, up till now, does not understand that the Russian DPs who have suffered so much under the Soviet dictatorship are all anti-Communists. "Oh, I do not want Russians," says an American farmer, "they are Communists." This is why very few Russians were admitted to this country. By the end of April, 1949, the percentage of assurances filed for each religious denomination was:

Catholic	64%
Jewish	26%
Protestant and Greek Orthodox	14%

And yet there are no less than 150,000 Russian Greek Orthodox DPs left in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria at the present time.

In discussing the problem of DPs, two questions are usually asked. First: "Do we need them?—Will the Displaced Persons displace our American people?" and second: "Who are these Displaced Persons? aren't we bringing into our country the 'Scum of scums,' as they were called by one of our Congressmen?"

According to the analysis of the U. S. Employment Service (material used from "Proceedings of National Resettlement Conference"), the U. S. has shortages in the following fields:

- Architecture
- Chemistry
- Education
- Engineering
- Physics
- Nursing
- Domestic help
- Farm labor

In the "Report of Committee No. 1 on Rural Resettlement," at the April, 1949, Conference on Displaced Persons, it is stated:

Recognizing agriculture as the basic industry providing food and fiber for the general welfare of the world, and that farming is the one great industry that needs displaced persons to carry on its enormous task and is the one great industry that can promise and provide housing and security for all the displaced persons settled upon it, and because the great majority of the displaced persons have come from farming communities or have rural backgrounds, we urge that all possible consideration and effort be made to secure as many assurances from the rural districts of the United States, as possible.

I hope that this answers the first question.

In answer to the second question—"Who are the DPs, what kind of people are they?"—I will answer that they are people of different professions, different characters, different classes; but they possess several characteristic traits in common—the yearning for a free, independent life, a strong feeling of hatred towards dictatorships, strong family ties, and a willingness to accept any kind of work. What struck me in my numerous contacts with the Displaced Persons is that notwithstanding the atheistic propaganda of the Communists, the majority of the former Soviet citizens are very religious. It is enough to say that there were 125 churches organized in the DP camps of Austria and Germany, and that during vespers and Sunday mass, the churches were always full. Even among the young people there is a great desire to return to their former religion.

"Sister," a simple DP peasant from Soviet Russia said to me, "I am a broken man, my health is bad, the doctors say it is nervousness. Can you blame me? I am very religious, I could never give up my faith in God. I carried in my heart my faith in Christ throughout these thirty years of revolution; I never dropped it, I never joined 'them' (the Communists) in their dirty work. I was arrested several times and escaped. The last seven years I lived like a wild beast in a cave in the forest. I cut timber. My home was thirty miles away. I went to see my family several times during the year, but I could not sleep at home. I slept in a sand pit, and once when 'they' surrounded my house, I hid in the manure pile. I stayed there for twenty-four hours, until 'they' left. But, my dear sister," he concluded, "my faith in God saved my family. The Lord heard my prayers, that is why we are here now in a free country . . . at last!"

One of the DPs got a teaching job in the West and came to say good-bye to me. "I have not seen you for a few months," he told me, "I was so busy. After I was appointed a teacher, I studied in the public library from morning till night. I am acquainted with all the American methods now. I am combining some of these methods with my former experience. I want to give my students all I can. This is the only way I can show the Americans my gratitude for giving

me the freedom and security I now have!"

Notwithstanding the terrible conditions in which the Displaced Persons live in Germany and Austria—sometimes two, three families in one room, or in barracks where many families are separated from each other by only a curtain; where food consists of half a pound of bread, thick soup in the afternoon and ersatz coffee in the evening—the parents still succeed in giving their children an education. Most of these who come to this country and enter American colleges and universities make very good students, and, after they have acquired the knowledge of the English language, attain better than average records.

Confined to life in the camps where they could not use their energy and initiative, the Displaced Persons are eager to show their gratitude to the people who brought them over to this country by being active in any sphere of work. I saw farms thriving under the supervision of DP agriculturists; I know scientists who came to the United States with seeds of plants producing rubber; scientists who brought over with them samples of fish which they used for experiments. Many of the professional DPs are already working in this country in their own fields, as botanists, chemists, engineers. I also know a number of professors, judges, generals, and engineers who were willing to take jobs as janitors, factory workers, porters, etc.

The DPs are human beings. One might find all kinds of people among them—good and bad, strong and weak, educated and illiterate. . . . But speaking about the average DP, I feel that we can only bend our heads before them. These people were persecuted, they were humiliated not only because they lost their standing in life, but because in many cases they became nothing but numbers. They were deprived for more than four years of the privilege of earning a living for their families and themselves. They were deprived of hope, and yet the majority of the DPs did not disintegrate. They haven't lost their faith either in God or in the justice of human beings. For four-and-a-half years they bore their misery with patience and courage.

And what are they suffering for? They are suffering for the same principles that this country is based upon—freedom, human rights; of which they were deprived in Soviet Russia. The American pioneers once fought for these same principles. And to those who ask me, "Who are the DPs?", I would answer: "They are those who are carrying the weight of all the injustice, the misery, and the wrong of the whole world, and that is why they deserve all the help and sympathy that can be given them."

Book Reviews

MIKOŁAJCZYK, STANISLAW. *The Rape of Poland: The Pattern of Soviet Aggression.* New York, Whittlesey House (McGraw-Hill Book Company), 1948. 309 pp. \$4.00.

NAGY, FERENC. *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain.* Translated by Stephen K. Swift. New York, Macmillan, 1948. 471 pp. \$6.00.

During World War II and its immediate aftermath in Eastern Europe, the most stubborn and determined fight for national independence and liberal democracy was carried on not by representatives of trade and industry, and not by workers, but by the peasantry, who made up the vast bulk of the population east of the Oder-Adriatic line. In the mass they were tough and courageous, sometimes even more than their leaders, and joined together above national boundaries, as they learned belatedly, they would have represented an unconquerable force. But despite the community of their economic interests, and despite the common hatred of the greatest of the peasants' enemies, Soviet Communism, their traditional loyalties to nation and church kept them fatefully divided.

Inevitably, therefore, the story of the Communist political conquest of Eastern Europe is the story of the piecemeal conquest of a disunited Eastern European peasantry, who represented probably the greatest obstacle to the achievement of Communist aims. Among the isolated forces of peasant resistance were arrayed the same dominant figures that had stood up against the

Germans—Petkov in Bulgaria, Maniu in Rumania, Mikolajczyk in Poland, and Nagy in Hungary—and the fall of each of these signalized in each country the final triumph of the Communists. The first two were not able to tell us of their struggle and final defeat, but the twists of fortune made it possible for the latter to give us invaluable and highly instructive accounts of those events, tactics, and developments through which Poland and Hungary were finally brought into complete submission to Communist rule. One should have liked to add that these are the depositions of statesmen who had a wide view of their problems, but unfortunately what we have are the records of men almost completely governed by the limitations and interest of class, party, and nation. Their broader services, as against Communism, were at best only indirect.

The two books read together make it clear that the process of reducing nations to satellite status was not rigorously uniform, and even was not necessarily a foregone conclusion in all cases. In the consolidation of Communist power, tempo and technique varied, depending on events and personalities and on the differences in the political and diplomatic backgrounds of the respective countries. A former enemy, like Hungary, could receive initially a good deal more considerate treatment than a former ally, like Poland. Thus, in both countries the process of establishing Stalinism has ended in identical final steps: complete elimination of the peasant leaders and the purge of those elements

among the Communists that represented local interests more distinctly. But in Poland the Communists had been entrenched from the beginning in a government bloc, with the Peasant Party in opposition, while in Hungary at the start the Smallholders Party was by far the strongest element in the all-party coalition and controlled the most important ministries.

Apart from such more superficial similarities between Communist techniques in both countries as the liquidation of all non-Communist leadership, the promotion of competitive or dummy peasant parties, and the use of anti-Semitism, there were basic and much more significant consistencies in policy. These lay not only in the advancement of Soviet economic interest and control and in the common objective of ultimate full control of domestic and foreign policy by Stalinists, but also in the application of tactics evolved by a quarter century of Communist Party experience. Nothing sums up these tactics better than the statement attributed by Nagy to Laszlo Rajk—"this strange Communist"—on the lessons of Lenin (p. 287): ". . . if you have five enemies, you should ally yourself with them; arrange to incite four of them against the fifth, then three against the fourth, and so on until you have only one enemy left in the alliance; you can then liquidate him yourselves and kick him out of the alliance." It is true that Rakosi later insisted that "It's quite impossible that Rajk should have made such a speech!" (p. 305), but apart from the standing model of the history of the Soviet Communist Party, nothing reveals the formula so well as the political history of

Poland and Hungary in the last five years.

There are many differences between the two accounts, and they arise as much from the differences in the political backgrounds as from the differences in the personalities and experiences of the writers. Mikolajczyk, though he was originally a relative moderate in respect to the Soviet Union, having in fact lost his premiership in the London government-in-exile because of his slight tendencies to compromise, is, quite understandably, extremely bitter. His narrative, dealing with the flagrant breaches of faith on the part not only of that enemy-ally Soviet Russia, but also of Poland's "friends," Great Britain, and the United States, simply does not allow for anything but a prosecutor's summation to the court of world history. There is only utter good and utter evil. Yet, as acceptable and honest as his version of the case is, and as completely deserving as he and his fellow Poles are, he does signal disfavors to anyone seeking to understand more fully the Polish political mentality and the problems involved in Polish-Soviet relations.

Mikolajczyk has, unwisely it seems, not admitted any data that would make more intelligible the brutalities of the Polish political scene and would partially relieve the ugliness in his picture of Communists in action. It is true that there was a Soviet-Communist terror rampant from 1944 on, but certainly its excesses were in considerable part due to the uncompromising resistance of a Polish underground that continued to fight against Communists, as it had against Nazis, to the extent of taking tens of thousands of lives. This

Mikolajczyk scarcely mentions. There are only the most fleeting references to those Poles who, like Anders, were before the end of World War II fully confident that there would immediately follow an armed struggle between the Soviet Union and the West. We learn only very indirectly of that unpublicized wartime Polish radio station in Britain that broadcast, to the Polish underground in eastern Europe, anti-Soviet propaganda that was virtually indistinguishable from that of German stations. Just as indirectly do we learn from these pages that Polish leaders in exile and underground, many far less compromising than even Mikolajczyk, wanted not only to regain the old eastern boundaries but to acquire East Prussia, Silesia, and the German lands east of the Oder. And most casually appears the reference to the dream, entertained by Polish politicians, of a Polish-led central-European organization, or "Central Union" as it was known in official propaganda, which would have extended from the Baltic through the Balkans. A denial that such a system would be another *cordon sanitaire* (p. 43) would hardly have been swallowed by the Soviet régime.

Nagy's *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* is in temper a quite different book. It is indeed, whether by design or not, almost like a novel in its portrayal of a politician gradually awakening to the meaning of Communism. Even then one is not fully sure that Nagy became a complete and uncompromising foe of that ideology. His words have none of Mikolajczyk's vehemence and his recriminations, when they appear, often leave the impression of having been shoe-horned into

place. He has generous things to say of Rakosi, but less kindly things of Rajk—at this writing just hanged—who, he tells us, had brothers who were prominent in the Arrow Cross and who himself, as Nagy informed Rakosi, was looked upon as leader by Hungarian anti-Semites. Nagy feels it necessary quite frequently to engage in apologetics and justify his actions in compromising and yielding to Soviet representatives and Hungarian Communists. At several points in his narrative (p. 192) it appears that he and his colleagues were pressed into bolder action by the rank and file among the Smallholders. Many of his explanations are readily acceptable when one considers the circumstances. Hungary was a conquered nation, and the leaders of the Smallholders Party hoped that by conciliating the Soviets they would have a stronger position at a peace conference. Also the Communists and the Soviet representatives in Hungary were not only cautious in their activities down to the end of 1945 but even promoted agrarian legislation towards which the peasant leaders were very sympathetic, though differing on several matters of detail and on method.

The basic difficulty was however simply the lack of government experience among Smallholder leaders. This perhaps more than any other contingency promoted Communist power in Hungary. Nagy himself entered the arena of national politics only in 1939, when he was elected to parliament and when he was thirty-six and still consciously a dirt farmer, despite his broad, scholarly reading and his humaneness. And it was under Soviet aegis and when he was barely forty-three that he became, as he says, the first peas-

ant in the history of Hungary to hold the reins of power. It was this very able but self-conscious and diffident "peasant," then, who in the spring of 1946, when the direction of the Communist course in Hungary was becoming clear, visited Moscow. There he and his colleagues were given a "class triple A reception"—contrasting sharply with the complete absence of formal reception in Washington two months later—were honestly impressed by many features of Soviet life, and were also thrown into confusion and panic by the discovery that dress clothes were expected at Soviet receptions and these they did not have. Nagy was moved when the Hungarians were promised by Stalin the most considerate treatment for their country. He writes (p. 214): "We, the members of the Hungarian government, all simple people, not burdened with the cunning of professional diplomacy, judged everything in good faith. Complacent to a certain degree, we were satisfied to have done good work in Moscow." In retrospect he also comments (p. 212): "Many times I meditated about the divergence between Soviet political action and the high-toned speech of Stalin. One could not but admire the high ethical levels of the human spirit it conveyed, and at times I felt that the Soviet leaders do not execute the policy of Stalin because the toast of that night and all his personal statements made to me during our stay in Moscow have always been in direct contrast with the acts of the Soviet government." Both volumes here under review document this "direct contrast" between Stalin promises and Soviet action.

Despite the weaknesses they contain, or rather because of them, the

books are unique historical documents. They provide invaluable material and insights on such world figures as Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin (particularly in *The Rape of Poland*) and certainly are of critical importance for their observations and comments on the new leaders of Poland and Hungary, purged and unpurged. After reading, also, what Mikolajczyk writes of the mass murder of Polish officers at Katyn Forest ten years ago, one can have only the most fugitive doubts that the Soviet government was responsible.

ALFRED A. SKERPAK
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DALLIN, DAVID J. *Soviet Russia and the Far East*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1948. 384 pp. \$5.00.

Once again the indefatigable Dr. Dallin has produced a book which no student of Russian or international affairs can afford to ignore. Considering the rapid development of events in the Orient which have already outraced the printed page, Dr. Dallin's book could not be more timely. For, as he points out, "domination of the Far East by one power is as great a threat to American security as domination of Europe by a single power."

Chronologically this volume, one of two which together cover about ninety years of Russian policy in the Far East, opens with the Japanese thrust in Manchuria (1931) and closes with the quickening advance of the Chinese Communists toward power early in 1948. It is the Soviet record, as Dr. Dallin finds it, of "obligations violated,

pledges broken and rules of international law disregarded . . . the necessary corollary of the 'dynamic' policy of extending borders, widening 'spheres,' and creating puppet states under puppet governments."

The central question for a reviewer, or reader, of this book is whether or not an active partisan in a struggle can write an impartial history of it. By definition, it would appear to be impossible. One would not expect a militant anti-Papist to publish an objective tome on Catholicism. Still, the argument will be raised that "objectivity" as such is overrated, and that in these perilous times, when the cold war is raging, there is no room for it.

Dr. Dallin's approach is not that of the traditional historian; his is rather a "white paper," an attempt to document his interpretation of the chief political, economic, and military steps in the penetration and expansion of Communism throughout key areas of Asia. To do this, Dr. Dallin has ferreted out much new and pertinent material, drawing on his wide knowledge of Russian Far Eastern studies as well as most available sources in English. But in reporting events of the last several years, Dr. Dallin has often relied upon informants so violently anti-Communist that their "facts" tend to weaken, rather than to bolster, anti-Communist arguments.

With his strongly-held point of view and his wide range of research tools, the author has chiseled out a bas-relief of Russian power politics. The first section is devoted to a description of the tug-of-war for Manchuria during the thirties, culminating in Tokyo's decision not to attack the Soviet Union, and Moscow's temporary withdrawal from Manchuria. Especially inter-

esting is the chapter called "'In Japan's Secret Service'" in which the author quotes revealingly from the official text of the Moscow trials to show the rôle played by the Japanese issue in the 1936-38 purges.

The Kremlin's involved, tenuous and fluctuating line toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese from 1930 to 1941 is taken up in the next section and includes two chapters on the origin and growth of the Chinese Soviets. Dr. Dallin then moves on to cover the period of World War II, with special reference to the Yalta, Potsdam, and Sino-Soviet Conferences. Analyzing the last of these, the author sets forth in parallel columns the partial terms of the Russian-Chinese alliance of 1896 and those of the Soviet-Kuomintang "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945." These columns make an interesting commentary on the unchanging ways of diplomacy.

It is in the postwar years that Soviet and American policies in the Far East become increasingly antagonistic. The focal point of this conflict is, and has been, China where, Dr. Dallin asserts, United States has "showed disorientation, impotence, and a curious lack of comprehension."

One contributing factor to that "curious lack of comprehension" is the continued inability of normally competent Western observers to agree upon the cause and cure of China's problems. Dr. Dallin is such a vigorous and sincere opponent of the Soviet system that he writes as though a consistently anti-Communist line alone would have been sufficient to "save" China from disintegration and Red advances—providing, of course, that we had held that line with enough dollars,

munitions, and men. There is, I believe, an honest difference of opinion on this point which Dr. Dallin too quickly brushes aside. His "white paper," incidentally, differs sharply on many points from the State Department's official version, issued last August.

For reasons which he no doubt deems sound, the author has underestimated the attraction of Communism (up to now) in China, with or without Russian power behind it. Therefore he fails to make clear the need of counter-balancing Communism with a positive program of radical social reform.

To back up his conclusions that the Chinese Communists have no validity (for the Chinese people) as an indigenous movement and are, in reality, merely a Russian controlled army in the field, Dr. Dallin draws upon pro-Chiang sources. He accepts without reservation the Nationalist claims about continuous, effective, direct Russian aid to Chu Teh's legions. This is comparable to accepting Communists "facts" on the total aims of the Marshall Plan. And so it goes. Dr. Dallin is not content to establish, very cogently, the ideological link between Mao Tse-tung and Moscow; he proceeds, as any protagonist would, to forge the link into a steel band. Not too many *Pravdas* ago the same mistaking a link for a band occurred in heated debates over the future of Yugoslavia.

It is not solely in the case of the Chinese Civil War that Dr. Dallin has been forced to accept one "set of facts" as against another in order to buttress his conclusions. Manabu Sano, a Japanese ex-Communist, let Dr. Dallin down rather badly on the situation in Japan where

Tokuda (also referred to as Toyoda on another page) is pictured as the kingpin in the Japanese Communist Party. Since his return, in 1946, Nosaka, not Tokuda, has been the real power. As the result of relying too heavily on such wish-thinking ex-Reds, Dr. Dallin is inclined to write off the Communists in Japan too soon, to be over-optimistic about a resurgent Nippon acting as a barrier to Soviet expansion, and to appear over-indulgent of the potential danger to Asia and to Japanese democracy from a strong rightist régime in Tokyo.

It is perhaps unfair to Dr. Dallin to ask a journalist to review his book, since he expresses little faith in most American reportage from the Far East. Let this temper my opinion that the last half of *Soviet Russia and the Far East* is written so close to the headlines that it often lacks the perspective which foreign correspondents usually wish they had time and space to develop.

R. E. LAUTERBACH
New York City

CREEL, GEORGE. *Russia's Race for Asia*. New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949. 264 pp. \$2.75.

This is a book about China; about Chiang, Stilwell, Hurley, and Marshall as viewed on a 1948 visit to the Nationalist areas. The chapters on Chinese Communism and Soviet objectives are based on second hand evidence. Mr. Creel will be remembered as the one in charge of United States censorship during World War I.

Russia's Race for Asia opens with these words: "It is not only the fate of China that quivers in sus-

pense; the future of all Asia hangs on the outcome of the struggle between the Communists and the Central government of Chiang Kai-shek . . . opening the way for Russia's mastery over more than half of the world's population."

Mr. Creel writes with three objectives: to prove Moscow's unbroken control of the Chinese Communist Party, to establish the responsibility of Roosevelt and Truman for the situation in China, and to call for a *positive* United States policy toward China. Whatever validity may lie in these theses, the argument is marred by the author's lack of precision in dealing with matters of fact and logic.

The beginnings of Chinese Communism are traced to Lenin's actions in 1919, and to subsequent co-operation with Sun Yat-sen. Then follows a sketch of the relations between Chiang and Borodin in 1928, and the subsequent expulsion of the Russians by the Kuomintang. The rise of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Chu Teh are related to the emergence of the Communist republic in Kaingsi, and its subsequent "Long March" to the northwest. Mr. Creel places much of the blame on Stilwell for the development of American prejudice against Chiang and condemns Roosevelt for the "Yalta Betrayals." Hurley and Marshall each then receive a chapter of comment. The book closes with several chapters devoted to an evaluation of Chinese Communist policies as related to the Soviet Union, land, Christianity, and propaganda.

The last chapter ends with this paragraph: "Every fact in the case gives the lie to Mao Tse-tung's claim that Communism's strength is a proof of popular support. But

for the Soviet Union and the United States, he and his followers would again be racing from covert to covert, hated by the people and hunted as bandits. Just as the Russians gave Mao arms, munitions, and whole provinces, so did the Roosevelt and Truman desertions and betrayals weaken Chiang Kai-shek's capacity for resistance."

Then follows an epilogue with this final statement: "To babble about a 'bona fide coalition government' and an 'autonomous Red China' is merely adding fatuity to blunders and betrayals. *A Communist China is Russia's China.* Acceptance of that fact is the one sound base for a new Chinese policy."

GEORGE B. CRESSEY
Syracuse University

Foote, Alexander. *Handbook for Spies*. Garden City, N. Y.
Doubleday, 1949. 273 pp. \$3.00.

Handbook for Spies purports to be the completely truthful and genuine autobiographical report of a non-Communist, renegade Englishman who served the Red Army Intelligence as a key link in their spy network in Switzerland. Perhaps Mr. Foote, whom the publishers tell us "is now in a government office in London," will object to being called a renegade. But he stayed safely in Switzerland, working faithfully for the Soviets from the outbreak of the war until 1944 (including ten not uncomfortable months in 1943-4 in a Swiss prison). He then went to Paris which had been liberated, made contact with his Soviet masters, and was sent to the U.S.S.R. where he stayed until

1947. Of course, Mr. Foote may have been a double agent who worked for both the Soviets and for his own country but there is not even the slightest hint of this in his book.

It is possible that the book is exactly what it purports to be, but it is too much to ask as Mr. Foote and his publishers do, that the whole thing be taken on faith. Is he being ingenuous or disingenuous when he points out that there is no documentation for his story and no way of checking it unless the reader has access to the archives of the Swiss secret police? Since there is no way of authenticating the story he tells, either he or the publisher ought to have taken greater pains to establish his *bona fides* if they expected the book to be taken seriously. The burden of proof is on them especially in view of certain inconsistencies in the book.

Was Mr. Foote a member of the British Communist Party? The blurb on the front of the dust jacket calls him "an English Communist." The too-brief identification of him offered by the publisher says that "he never actually joined" the Party. He refers to himself as a non-member but hints that he might have given up his membership before undertaking his missions. He also says that his most important qualification for espionage was "in Russian eyes, a good political background."

Speaking of Spain where he served with the Communists during the Civil War, he writes in one place (p. 243) that the Republic lost because its enemies were too strong and its friends too weak. But earlier (pp. 6 and 7) he wrote that the Soviets did not want the Republicans to win the war and de-

liberately sacrificed them to Soviet *Realpolitik*.

He says (p. 9) that for himself and his fellow Soviet spies "the mercenary motive was subsidiary," but his account of his actions as a spy and spy-master is much concerned with salaries, expense accounts, and bonus payments for special jobs or notable successes.

Mr. Foote devotes one chapter to the Soviet "Blueprint for Espionage" and another to the "Blueprint in Action." In the course of the former he remarks that the "blueprint" bears little resemblance to the spy net which was uncovered in Canada. This he explains on the ground that the Canadian net was "an *ad hoc* affair set up in rather a hurry." He claims, further, that the Canadian net was inoperative from the beginning of the war until Russia was sure of victory and sure, also, that her allies would not make a separate peace. Only then, according to Foote, did she hastily reactivate the Canadian net. Laying aside this rather curious line of argument, it may be noted that the official report of the Royal Commission states that Soviet espionage in Canada was begun at least as early as 1924 and that two Soviet officials were sent to Canada in 1942 to reform the organization. This does not seem to support Mr. Foote's contention. He may be right in labeling the Canadian net an exception to the general practice. But it does not contribute to the credibility of his narrative to find that the one documented account we possess does not accord with his.

Finally, one may ask why Mr. Foote, who had served the Soviets with apparent faithfulness for almost a decade and who presumably had a bright future ahead as an

important part of their machine, suddenly walked out from Soviet Berlin to the British sector. His explanation is that his eyes were finally opened to the real nature of the Soviet system and plans. This may be so. But on the other hand, he earlier makes a complaint which somehow seems more genuinely revealing. Moscow, he writes (p. 189) "was entirely ruthless, with no sense of honour, obligation, or decency towards its servants. They were used as long as they were of any value and then cast aside with no compunction and no compensation."

The editing of the book was carelessly done. One can forgive the numerous British colloquialisms, but not such phrases as "took a bed off one of my fellow travelers."

WARREN B. WALSH
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STRAKHOVSKY, L. I. (Ed.), *A Handbook of Slavic Studies*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949. 753 pp. \$12.50.

The preface reveals that exactly one month before D-Day a group of Slavic scholars "gathered at the Harvard Club in New York City" to launch the *Handbook* on its way after "a lively discussion." The war did intrude subsequently to delay the project, so that the completed volume represents the work of five years. Its publication was facilitated by a grant from the Division of Humanities of the Rockefeller Foundation.

The purpose of the *Handbook* is to "present under one cover a digest of the history and literature of all the Slavs so as to serve as a

reference book for the student, the scholar, and the general reader alike." This purpose has been accomplished. The history and literature of every branch of the Slavic family, including the Lusatian Wends, have been treated in varying detail. Each chapter has an unusually large bibliography in the western European languages. References to works in Slavic languages have been restricted to footnotes whereby authors acknowledge indebtedness to specific Slavic sources, except in one unfortunate case. One contributor, apparently believing that the inclusion of Slavic titles was a matter of prestige, procured lists of them from another author and appended them to his chapters as the "best studies" of the subject, although he makes no use of them and his faulty transliteration of Slavic names arouses the suspicion that he could not.

Approximately one third of the *Handbook* is devoted to Russia. Five chapters give a summary of Russian history from the Kievan period to the Second World War, and three chapters are devoted to Russian literature. A separate chapter deals with the Ukraine. The material on Russia alone would make a book of over two hundred fifty pages, with ample bibliography (the bibliography attached to the chapter on the Soviet Union numbers twenty-three pages and is longer than the text). Polish history is treated in four chapters by Professor Halecki and there is an additional one on Polish literature. The Czechs and Slovaks are limited to four chapters, including one on literature, the South Slavs to three, and the Lusatian Wends to two. The *Handbook* is rounded out by chapters dealing with Slavic origins, lin-

guistics, and culture, and the long conflict between Slav and German. Professor Strakhovsky has compiled a comparative chronology of events in the Slavic world from 811 to 1946, covering forty-seven pages.

Analysis of the merits of individual chapters would require a lengthy review. Certain general characteristics were imposed by the nature of the book. When, for example, Russian history is compressed into eight chapters the result unavoidably resembles, at times, a blend of chronicle with text-book. Under such circumstances proportion and perspective are hard to attain. Professor Frederiksen gives us an outstanding example of both in his admirable essay on the Ukraine. One general criticism might be the relatively scanty treatment of economic and social conditions in the Slavic countries. One learns almost as little from Professor Halecki about Polish economics as about the origins of the Russo-Polish war of 1920. The question of literary style may be irrelevant where scholars are concerned, and most of the contributors manage an adequate, if stereotyped, academic prose, but there are outright grammatical lapses which someone should have known how to correct. The book contains one astounding error. Pro-

fessor Senn, after locating the domain of the "Tchakavian" dialect of Serbo-Croatian "in the south" of Yugoslavia instead of in Dalmatia and on certain islands, asserts that "the literary language of both the Serbs and the Croats is based on Tchakavian." Actually, of course, the Serbo-Croatian literary language, as well as the colloquial language, is based on the "Shtokavski" dialect, and Professor Senn's statement, which is enough to make Vuk S. Karajich turn in his grave, could have been prevented by a glance at any of the grammars cited by the author in his accompanying footnote.

The fact that the *Handbook* has shortcomings does not diminish its very great value. The student may consult it for well-organized and concise information about any Slavic people. The specialist in the affairs of any one Slavic nation will find it a means of broadening his knowledge of the whole Slavic world. Let me repeat that the copious bibliographies represent a real service to western scholarship. Professor Strakhovsky deserves sincere thanks for his time and persevering effort in bringing to completion this monumental book.

JOHN CLINTON ADAMS
Dartmouth College

BOOK NOTICES

BLACKETT, P. M. S. *Fear, War, and the Bomb. Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy.* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949. 244 pp. \$3.50.

P. M. S. Blackett, Professor of Physics at the University of Manchester, is a recognized leader in the fields of atomic and cosmic ray research. Member of Britain's Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy from 1945 to 1948, holder of the American Medal of Merit for his work in the anti-submarine campaign, Professor Blackett received the 1948 Nobel award in physics. Whatever comments he makes about nuclear science and/or the scientific aspects of the bomb carry the weight of his merited prestige as a scientist.

But *Fear, War and the Bomb* is equally concerned with international politics and policies—fields in which Professor Blackett has many convictions but no special qualifications. His comments are provocative, sometimes convincing, but more often they seem ill-founded. He holds, for example, that the only reason for the American atom-bombing of Japan was to end the war before Russia could get into it and claim her right to be heard in the post-war settlement. He believes that the Baruch Plan "... was a forerunner of the explicit Truman doctrine . . ."; that its primary motivation was to injure the U.S.S.R. both by limiting her military power and inhibiting her economic development; and that it was "shrewd" and "specious" rather than generous.

Communism and Academic Freedom. *The Record of the Tenure Cases at the University of Washington.* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1949. 125 pp. \$1.50.

Publication by the Regents of the University of Washington of the full text of the report of the faculty Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom. Also printed are President Allen's analysis of the report, his recommendations to the Board of Regents, his review of the case, and a statement of policy. The charges are set forth verbatim in an appendix. Whatever views one may hold as to the merits of the case and the wisdom of the decision, few will care to deny, on the basis of this verbatim report, that "due process" was scrupulously followed.

KNOP, W. *Prowling Russia's Forbidden Zone.* New York, A. A. Knopf, 1949. 200 pp. \$2.75.

Journalistic account, but one of the very few accounts we have, of the Soviet zone in Germany. A German-born British citizen, Mr. Knop had been active in the anti-Nazi underground from 1933 to 1939. Using some of the contacts and skills which he developed at that time, he made an extensive trip through the Soviet zone in the summer of 1948. Jena, Dresden, Leipzig, Leuna, Chemnitz, and Plauen were on his itinerary. The two latter places are in the region of the slave labor camps and the uranium mines. His contacts included both Germans and Russians. Particularly interesting is his account of the Nazi-Communist co-operation at various levels. His

"cops and robbers" approach tends to obscure more important parts of the story.

MATL, J. AND SCHMID, H. F. (Editors). *Eastern Review. A Survey of the Cultural Life of East Central and South-eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union.* Published quarterly in English, French, and German by Ferd. Kleinmayer Verlag, Klagenfurt-Wien, Austria. Single Copies, \$0.80.

Issues to date are: Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1948), No. 2 (July-September, 1948) and No. 3-4 (October-December, 1948). Receipt in this country is irregular. The double number (3-4) was not received here until October, 1949. "Chronicles of Cultural Events" are featured. Most of the books so far reviewed are Slavic publications. There is no discernible uniformity of views in the articles, commentaries, or reviews. Correspondence with western scholars is welcomed.

MIRSKY, D. S. *A History of Russian Literature.* Revised and brought up-to-date by Francis J. Whitefield. New York, Knopf. 1949. 515 pp. \$5.00.

Mirsky's *A History of Russian Literature* and *Contemporary Russian Literature* have been generally recognized as classics—the best available surveys of Russian literature in any language. Both books have long been out of print. Now the two volumes have been completely revised and brought into a single volume. The Editor has omitted a few sections on drama, literary criticism, minor nineteenth century novelists, and some bib-

liographical and biographical material. The present volume is thus a survey of Russian literature from the beginning through the middle 20's. A postscript is added by the Editor, reviewing the general development of Soviet literature. Mirsky's tone and his literary and political judgments have not been altered. The appearance of this volume should be welcomed by the student of Russian literature as well as the general reader.

NELSON, WILLIAM (Editor). *Out of the Crocodile's Mouth. Russian Cartoons about The United States from "Krokodil," Moscow's Humor Magazine.* Current Soviet Thought Series. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press. 1949. 116 pp. \$2.50.

This volume presents a cross-section of cartoons concerning the United States appearing from 1946 to 1949 in the official Soviet humorist journal, *Krokodil*. It presents considerable documentary interest, illustrating the campaign of hatred for America which the Soviet government embarked upon since the summer of 1946. With unprecedented vigor the *Krokodil* exposes America as a country of grasping capitalists, gangsters, lynchings, decaying culture, and falling standard of living. On the international scene, this nation is portrayed as shamelessly engaged in a campaign for world domination. "If the reader fails to discover cartoons favorable to America or suggesting the possibility of reconciliation between the two nations," says the editor, "it is because there were none in the *Crocodile*." This exceptionally powerful campaign of

agitation was necessary, the editor thinks, because the Russian people "will not readily learn to hate America." This volume is recommended, especially to those who are still of the opinion that America is as much to blame as Russia for the worsening of the relations between the two countries since the end of the war.

RIAزانovsky, V. A. *Razvitiye russkoi nauchnoi mysli v XVIII st. Nauka o prirode*. (Development of Russian Scientific Thought in XVIII-XX Centuries. Natural Sciences). Privately printed. Address orders to the author: 1855 Olive Street, Eugene, Oregon. 1949. 133 pp. \$2.50.

This brief survey of Russian Scientific Thought may be considered as a supplement to the author's general survey of Russian Culture (v. I was published in 1947; v. II—in 1948). It comprises chapters on M. V. Lomonosov, Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, Biology, and Geology.

SELLARS, R. W., MCGILL, V. J., AND FARBER, M. (Editors). *Philosophy for the Future. The Quest of Modern Materialism*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. 657 pp. \$7.50.

The chapters likely to be of greatest interest to readers of this journal are: "Hegel, Marx, and Engels" by A. Cornu; "Some Aspects of Historical Materialism" by B. J. Stern; and "On Some Tendencies in Modern Economic Theory" by M. Dobbs. The editors believe that the rise of science has been accompanied by an increase in humaneness,

"progress [which] has resulted in an increasingly materialist outlook. But . . . it is a more subtle and adequate kind of materialism." Their purpose in presenting the volume is "the exploration and reformulation of materialism."

STRAKHOVSKY, LEONID I. *Three Poets of Modern Russia*. (Gumilev, Akhmatova, and Mandelstam.) Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1949. 114 pp. \$3.00.

This is a study of the three leading Acmeist poets. The School of Acmeism started as a reaction against Symbolism and played a dominant rôle during the seven years preceding the Revolution of 1917. The goals of this School were neo-classic—precision, detachment, and a rational approach to artistic creation. The three poets discussed in this volume deserve to be known outside of Russia; they were not only excellent craftsmen, but technically had also a considerable influence on some of the major contemporary Soviet poets. Akhmatova is, perhaps, of special interest because of the literary purge of August, 1946, of which she was a major victim. The volume contains a number of competent translations from these three poets by the author of this volume.

VIRSKI, FRED. *My Life in the Red Army*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. 260 pp. \$3.50.

For anyone who is interested in the amours, adventures, and incredible good fortune of one Fred

Virski this volume is highly recommended. For those interested in obtaining a detailed story of how the Red Army trains and treats its personnel, or in getting light upon how the Red Army was able to recover from the enormous losses of the first six months of Soviet-German conflict, that same recommendation cannot be given. Mr. Virski may be able to shed light upon such important questions, but he unfortunately chose not to do so.

YARMOLINSKY, AVRAHM (Editor).
A Treasury of Russian Verse.
New York, Macmillan, 1949.
314 pp. \$5.00.

This anthology offers translations of Russian verse from Derzhavin to present-day Soviet poets. Roughly, post-revolutionary verse

occupies about one third of the book. The book contains also a short history of Russian poetry by the editor and biographical sketches of the Russian poets represented. The inclusions, according to the editor, were made largely for their intrinsic merit. Most of the poems were translated into English by Babette Deutsch; quite a few of these translations have appeared before in an anthology of Russian verse first brought out by the present editor in 1921. The quality of the translations is unequal. So far as translations from the major Russian poets (Pushkin and Lermontov) are concerned, they do not compare favorably (as to conveying the music and the spirit of the original) to the versions appearing in C. M. Bowra's two anthologies of Russian verse, or the scattered translations of Vladimir Nabokov.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

- BALZAK, S. S., VASYUTIN, V. F., FEIGIN, YA. G. (Edited by Chauncy D. Harris. Translated by R. M. Hankin and O. A. Titelbaum. Preface by J. A. Morrison.) *Economic Geography of the USSR*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. 620 pp. \$10.00.
- DEUTSCHER, I. *Stalin*. London & New York, Oxford University Press, 1949. 600 pp. \$5.00.
- ECKARDT, H. VON. *Ivan the Terrible*. (Translated by Catherine A. Phillips.) New York; Knopf, 1949. 421 pp. \$5.00.
- EMMENS, R. G. *Guests of the Kremlin*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. 291 pp. \$3.00.
- ROY, U. N. *The Russian Revolution*. Calcutta-12, India, Renaissance Publishers (15, Bankim Chatterjee street), 1949. 631 pp. Rs. 18.—
- SCHWARTZ, H. *The Soviet Economy. A Selected Bibliography of Materials in English*. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1949. 93 pp. Paper, \$1.75; cloth, \$2.25.
- SPECTOR, I. *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture*. New York, Van Nostrand, 1949. 454 pp. \$4.50.
- TATE, M. *The United States and Armaments*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948. 312 pp. \$6.00.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

ON LENIN

In his very fair and complimentary review of my book *Lenin: A Biography*, Bertram D. Wolfe has taken issue with several points which I should like to clarify because of their importance toward an understanding of Lenin.

1. Mr. Wolfe claims that I was in error when I said that Plekhanov omitted "the dictatorship of the proletariat" from his draft program until Lenin forced him to put it in. "An examination of Plekhanov's original draft, available in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. 5," says Mr. Wolfe, "would have convinced Mr. Shub of the apocryphal nature of this legend."

According to P. Lepeshinsky, one of the original Bolsheviks and a close friend of Lenin during the *Iskra* period, the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat was inserted in the program of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party on the insistence of Lenin. (*Staryi Bolshevik*, No. 5 (8), 1933, pp. 7-8.)

In volume 5 of Lenin's *Collected Works* (Russian edition—1928) to which Mr. Wolfe alludes, on page 29, we read the following by Lenin:

Incidentally, the draft [as written by Plekhanov] fails to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the original draft did. Even if this was an accident or an oversight, it is still undeniable that the conception of dictatorship of the proletariat is incompatible with the *positive* [Lenin's italics] recognition of [the importance of] support for the proletariat from outside its ranks.

In point 14 of Plekhanov's draft program, he spoke of the proletariat's need for "support of the other groups of the population which are exploited by the upper classes" in its drive to become "master of the situation."

In the final program, the point on the dictatorship of the proletariat was inserted in the program, on Lenin's insistence. That Plekhanov was not always consistent in his polemics against Lenin's views, I have pointed out clearly in my book.

2. Mr. Wolfe objects to the "anecdote by Vodovozov to the effect that Lenin rejoiced at the famine of 1891 because "it would make more revolutionists."

"The Vodovozov anecdote," says Mr. Wolfe, "has been subjected to very convincing criticism by Leon Trotsky in his *Youth of Lenin*, a work that Mr. Shub does not appear to have utilized."

Vodovozov relates that in 1892 Lenin attacked the liberals and

radicals who organized a committee of citizens to aid the starving peasants. The famine, Lenin said:

. . . will cause the peasant to reflect on the fundamental facts of capitalist society. It will destroy his faith in the Czar and in Czarism and will in time speed the victory of the revolution. It is easy to understand the desire of so-called "society" to come to the assistance of the starving, to ameliorate their lot. This "society" is itself part of the bourgeois order. . . . The famine threatens to create serious disturbances and possibly the destruction of the entire bourgeois order. Hence the efforts of the well-to-do to mitigate the effect of the famine are quite natural. . . . Psychologically this talk of feeding the starving is nothing but an expression of the saccharine sweet sentimentality so characteristic of our intelligentsia.

V. V. Vodovozov was for over thirty years one of the outstanding Russian publicists, who devoted his life to the struggle for freedom and humanism. I see no reason for accepting Trotsky's attempt to discredit Vodovozov's account, particularly in view of the admission in the Soviet magazine *Katorga i Ssylka* (No. 1, 1930, pp. 20-21) that "precisely Vodovozov's reminiscences—in some parts clearly tendentious—make it possible to establish the fact of the irreconcilable, merciless revolutionary position taken by the 21-year-old Vladimir Ilich toward the saccharine-sweet sentimentality of the intelligentsia."

3. Mr. Wolfe suggests that a quotation in my book from the youthful Lenin—expressing doubts whether his beloved brother Alexander would ever become a revolutionist because of his preoccupation with natural science—is taken from a questionable source. As a matter of fact, it is from the reminiscences of Lenin's wife, Mme. Krupskaya (See: *Vospominaniya o Lenine*, parts 1-2, Moscow, 1932, p. 12).

4. Mr. Wolfe considers the love affair between Elizabeth K. and Lenin to be a "doubtful story."

The story of Lenin's affair with Elizabeth K. appeared in the French magazine *Intransigeant* and in the Paris weekly Russian magazine, *Illustrirovannaya Rossiya*, in the issues of October 31, November 7, 14, and 21, 1936. The identity of Elizabeth K. was not revealed by the editors, but the story was copyrighted by Gregory Alexinsky, a former Bolshevik leader.

Elizabeth K. mentioned meetings and conversations not only with Lenin, but also with several other well-known Bolsheviks, who then were still alive in Moscow. None of them denied her story.

She also published photostatic copies of excerpts of letters from Lenin to her, clearly written in Lenin's handwriting.


In quoting from her memoirs in my book *Lenin: A Biography*, I pointed out that while it is quite possible that Alexinsky, or the editors of the memoirs, have glamorized portions of her story, I used only those portions of her testimony that tally with the published memoirs of other associates of Lenin and with what I have learned over a period of years about Lenin's life and views from people who were close to him at various times.

In May, 1948, after the publication of my book, an old Russian Socialist who knew Lenin intimately for more than thirty years not only confirmed the essential facts of the story, but even suggested the real identity of Elizabeth K.

And only recently, Paul Berline, an early Russian Marxist, a contemporary of Lenin, and the first Russian biographer of Karl Marx, wrote a long article from Paris in the New York *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, entitled "Lenin's Love Affair," in which he said:

Shub "has taken from [the memoirs] several episodes which characterize Lenin. There is not the slightest doubt that the story is based on original letters of Lenin and on the authentic memoirs of Elizabeth. This could be clearly seen from the many little details that only a person who was intimate with Lenin could have known."

David Shub.



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